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Abstract

QKD systems combine cryptographic primitives with quantum information theory
to produce a theoretic unconditionally secure cryptographic key. However, real-world
implementations of QKD systems are far from ideal and significantly differ from the
theoretic model. Because of this, real-world QKD systems require additional practical
considerations when implemented to achieve secure operations. In this thesis, a content
analysis of the published literature is conducted to determine if established security and
cryptographic standards and best practices are addressed in real world, practical QKD
implementations. The research reveals that most published, real world QKD
implementations do not take advantage of established security and cryptographic
standards and best practices. Based upon an analysis of existing security and
cryptographic standards and best practices, systems architecture methodology is used to
make recommendations for how these standards can and should be applied to establish a
practical, secure, QKD system framework.
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SECURITY STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICE CONSIDERATIONS FOR
QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION (QKD)

I. Introduction

1.1 Background
Classical cryptographic methods rely on the computing time necessary to solve
difficult mathematical problems such as discrete logarithms and factoring large prime
numbers to provide security. They work by ensuring the time cost verses benefit gained
to break the algorithm does not make solving the problem feasible for an attacker [1];
however, increases in computer processing speeds over time have prompted newer and
more sophisticated methods of encrypting and protecting data for purposes of information
security.
The past few decades, research has yielded a new technology called Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD) which utilizes several quantum mechanics principles in
conjunction with cryptographic primitives as a way to provide theoretically unconditional
security. The appeal of QKD is driven by the unconditional security it provides despite
any advances made in computing power or mathematics. As QKD becomes a more viable
alternative to existing cryptographic technologies, researchers have sought to determine
just how much security a QKD system provides through both mathematic and
experimental rigor. While this research has produced a great deal of important
discoveries for the future of QKD, very little has been published investigating whether
systems meet existing security standards.
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1.2 Problem Statement
To understand the security of a QKD system, an understanding of its fundamental
principles is required. A QKD system claims to theoretically provide unconditional
security by combining three key concepts. First, it utilizes a cryptographic primitive
known as a one-time pad [2:10-12]. A one-time pad is a symmetric cryptographic
algorithm that requires a random key the same length as the message to be encrypted and,
provided the key is never reused, is the only information theoretically secure encryption
primitive. Information theoretically secure means that it has been formally proven that
knowing the cipher text message in no way gives information regarding the plain text [1].
Second, it employs a message authentication primitive which utilizes a fraction of the key
in a Universal 2-Hash function [2:10-12]. Third, the principle that makes QKD a truly
unique system is the key distribution primitive which relies on Quantum Information
Theory that prevents bits sent on a quantum channel from being copied or intercepted
without notice [2:10-12]. Ideally, when these three concepts are implemented in a QKD
system, the message sent is secure.
Unfortunately, while theoretical proofs hold great value in determining strengths
and weaknesses of a system, the real world implementations very rarely meet ideal
conditions. These non idealities often introduce vulnerabilities. Standards and processes
are developed to govern implementation, address non-idealities and to determine whether
a system meets security requirements. In the case of a system such as QKD where
security is a main system function, it becomes absolutely essential to use security
standard considerations when developing a baseline architecture. This research seeks to
answer the following question: Does existing QKD research consider security standards?

2

Further, this research seeks to synthesize a prototypical QKD system utilizing systems
architecture that incorporates industry security standards and best practices.

1.3 Research Objectives and Hypothesis
This research surveys cryptographic and information technology security
standards to examine their use to date in researching QKD and to suggest a starting
framework for secure QKD design. It considers accepted practices from the standards
community as well as systems engineering processes related to architectural development
and definition to provide a baseline for consideration. Specifically, this thesis seeks to
answer the following research questions:
1) To what extent do published QKD systems meet security standards?
2) Does systems architecture methodology provide a blueprint for future QKD
development?

1.4 Methodology
This research will be conducted utilizing content analysis and will synthesize a
prototypical QKD system using architectural definition. To support the stated objectives,
a minimal systems engineering architecture will be built as an example of how an
engineer may develop a QKD system baseline fulfilling system and security
requirements. These requirements are based off the functional requirements of QKD,
technical standards and user needs.
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1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
By virtue of the nascent technological nature of QKD as well as the methodology
described above and in Ch 3, there are several limitations to this research.
1) QKD systems are limited to hardware/software components that are currently
available. For example, an ideal system requires a single photon generator to
transmit bits using individual photons. In reality, single photon generators are not
available for use and so another method, such as an attenuated weak laser pulse
may be used instead.
2) Systems do not function in isolation and design must include the system
context and so any system presented here will be strictly a general baseline for
consideration, not a complete model for validation.
3) The methodology used in this research is limited by the availability of public
literature that addresses QKD implementation. Most research papers are
necessarily constricted by length and effectively focus on specific aspects of the
system rather than developing a coherent whole.
4) The scope of this research is limited. As such, only 10 published papers and
four industry standards were selected for review. An attempt was made to present
a sampling of papers. Industry standards were selected based on applicability and
generalness of use.

1.6 Implications
QKD public research to date has largely been focused on technology and theory
development, not engineering rigor. As a result most available security investigations
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have relied on either theoretical proofs or laboratory experiments. Although at the time of
this research QKD standards requirements are in the process of being formalized
[2,4,5,6,7], the newness of the technology has meant that production and use of QKD has
outpaced these efforts. This thesis is an attempt to show that industry approaches applied
with sufficient engineering rigor are a methodology that should be considered and to
provide a foundational architecture for decision makers and future research and
development.

1.7 Preview
This thesis is organized into 5 chapters. The introductory chapter discusses the
system security considerations in terms technical standards and system architectural
definition.
•

Ch 2 examines and classifies general QKD information, security
standards, selected QKD literature and systems engineering architecture
development.

•

Ch 3 describes the research methodology and introduces the Security
Criteria Matrix and architectural development process used to conduct the
research.

•

Ch 4 provides results of the Security Criteria Matrix and presents a
proposed prototypical QKD architecture

•

Ch 5 draws conclusions regarding research objectives, answers the
investigative questions and proposes future research.
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II. Literature Review

2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter will provide a review of key literature applicable to QKD research. It
will give a general overview of QKD development and discusses ten published papers
that will be analyzed in Chapter 4. Additionally it will review the four IT security
standards that will be addressed in Chapter 4: Department of Defense Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria [18], Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation[19], Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules[20], and the five
ETSI documents [2,4,5,6,7]. Finally, this chapter will provide an overview of DoDAF
v2.0 architecture guidelines [22].

2.2 Description/Background
The birth of quantum cryptography was a paper on conjugate coding by Stephen
Wiesner in the late 1960’s [33]. Wiesner postulated how quantum mechanics could be
used to produce bank notes unable to be counterfeited. His research was mostly
disregarded until Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard discovered how to combine
Wiesner’s ideas with public key cryptography [34]. Shortly after, the real breakthrough
was the realization that photons could be used to transmit information [9:2]. Eventually,
this realization lead to a paper published in 1984 which put forth the now well known
BB84 quantum key distribution protocol [8].
In the QKD protocol proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984, single photons
are polarized in one of four potential orientations using two possible bases. The
6

polarization of the photon is assigned based on the desired bit and basis to be sent. The
process depicted in Figure 1 is:
1. Alice randomly selects a bit and basis and polarizes photons accordingly.
2. Alice sends the polarized photons to Bob.
3. Bob receives polarized photons through his own randomly chosen basis
4. Alice and Bob then communicate via public channel to reveal which basis
they selected for each photon. Photons where matching bases were chosen are kept;
photons where bases did not match are ignored.
5. Alice and Bob then perform error correction/verification and in an ideal
system what they have left is a secure key [8].
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Figure 1. BB84 Protocol [8]
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Since then, experimental quantum cryptography has continued to progress.
Eventually, it was postulated that by utilizing a quantum distribution system, combined
with a symmetric key known as a one-time-pad, and an appropriate hash function,
information could be encrypted that was theoretical secure [2:10-12]. Problems that arise
in experimental systems stem from non-idealities that occur such as equipment
constraints, environmental context, and protocol or procedural weaknesses. As a result,
much work has been done to investigate both the theoretical and experimental
weaknesses in QKD and several well-known attacks have been published and mitigated
[4].

2.3 Quantum Key Distribution Published Papers
Three distinct types of QKD papers will be reviewed in this thesis. This research
will review early papers on QKD, various practical implementations, and finally
vulnerability analyses.
Two critical early papers proposing quantum key distribution protocols are [8, 9].
“Quantum Cryptography: Public Key Distribution and Coin Tossing” published by
Bennett and Brassard was one of the first papers to propose a protocol for using quantum
particles to transmit information over a quantum channel in such a way that it would be
impossible to eavesdrop without being detected [8]. This protocol, known as BB84,
describes the secure distribution of random key information between two parties. The
paper entitled “Experimental Quantum Cryptography” describes a more detailed design
of the first experimental implementation of a QKD channel between two users that share
no initial secret information [9]. The paper provides an illustration of the original QKD
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protocol, the modifications necessary to implement the protocol experimentally, the
apparatus used, possible sources of information leakage and the actual experimental data
transmitted.
More recent proposals for implementing a QKD system include [10,11,12].
“Quantum Key Distribution over 122 km of Standard Telecom Fiber” reports the first
demonstration of QKD using standard fiber over 100 km [10]. It presents a practical
implementation and discusses the error rate, key formation rate and other factors limiting
maximum fiber length and therefore maximum distance between QKD nodes. “How to
Implement Decoy-State Quantum Key Distribution for a Satellite Uplink with 50 dB
Channel Loss” addresses how to implement QKD via satellite, which act as a trusted
node to link two or more ground stations [11]. The system presented handles up to 57dB
photon loss, which is normally considered to be a very high transmission loss, and
confirms the viability of a satellite uplink QKD system. “Optical Networking for
Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Communications” discusses leveraging existing
fiber infrastructures for quantum communications [12]. This paper describes a potential
architecture to support widespread quantum communications that provides a more
efficient networking solution than the more common fixed end-to-end connections
between Alice and Bob. It does so by experimentally demonstrating several fundamental
capabilities of optical networking that apply to QKD and examining the practical impact
to quantum signals.
The third class of papers reviewed is specific attacks and security vulnerabilities
in practical QKD [13,14,15,16,17]. “Has Quantum Cryptography Been Proven Secure”
presents an analysis of the current state of quantum cryptography with particular
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emphasis on engineering issues [13]. The purpose is to demonstrate the need for more
rigorous examination of presumed weaknesses. The paper disregards hardware and
software shortcomings in favor of focusing on defining the problem to be solved in terms
of mathematical and theoretical rigor. “After-gate Attack on a Quantum Cryptosystem”
presents a specific intercept-resend attack against a specific QKD system [14]. The paper
examines how the intercept-resend can be accomplished by targeting a specific
component of QKD, the gated single-photon detectors, using bright pulses as faked states
and outlines how to mitigate this vulnerability. “Information Leakage via Side Channels
in Freespace BB84 Quantum Cryptography” analyzes a free space BB84 implementation
using polarization encoded attenuated pulses [15]. The report focuses on potential side
channels by measuring all degrees of freedom. “Time-Shift Attack in Practical Quantum
Cryptosystems” discusses a vulnerability caused by an efficiency mismatch between two
single photon detectors [16]. The paper examines what circumstances cause the
vulnerability and discusses measures to mitigate. “Effects of Detector Efficiency
Mismatch on Security of Quantum Cryptosystems” is another paper that addresses
vulnerabilities presented from detector efficiency mismatches in QKD systems [17].
Experimental data is presented as well as protection measures to prevent exploitation.

2.4 Security Standards
Over the years, many security Information Technology (IT) standards have been
published from the existing body of knowledge. Some are tailored for military use, while
others are designed for commercial application. Some standards are meant to be general,
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while others have detailed specific requirements. The standards reviewed in this research
are outlined in the proceeding section.
Published in 1983, the “Orange Book,” also titled “Department of Defense
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria” is part of the well known “Rainbow
Series” of computer standards used by the US government in the 1980s and 1990s [35].
They were developed to provide a way of evaluating commercially available trusted
automatic data processing systems. The document itself declares three stated purposes.
They are [18]:
1) “To provide a standard to manufacturers as to what security features to build
into their new and planned, commercial products in order to provide widely
available systems that satisfy trust requirements (with particular emphasis on
preventing the disclosure of data) for sensitive applications.
2) To provide DoD components with a metric with which to evaluate the degree
of trust that can be placed in computer systems for the secure processing of
classified and other sensitive information.
3) To provide a basis for specifying security requirements in acquisition
specifications.”
With these purposes in mind, the Orange Book breaks security requirements
into four main categories: Security Policies, Accountability, Assurance and
Documentation. Security policies require a set of rules used by the system to determine
allowed access for users and accurately determine information sensitivity. Accountability
mandates that access to information be managed based on who is attempting the access
and requires the use of audit information to hold the system accountable. Assurance
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specifies that mechanisms be evaluated, protected and that and each requirement is
enforced. Documentation supports the first three requirements [18].
The Common Criteria (CC) for Information Technology Security Evaluation is a
set of documents developed by the international community that form an agreement by
which IT can be evaluated to determine the fulfillment of certain security properties.
They are designed to protect assets from “unauthorized disclosure, modification, or loss
of use” [19: v1, 10]. The CC provides requirements for security functionality and
assurance for hardware, firmware and software. In general the CC is intended to be
flexible and enable a range of security properties to be looked at for a range of products.
Given this flexibility, any meaning derived from the CC must be evaluated within
appropriate context. Additionally, there are certain topics that are stated as beyond the
scope of the criteria.
The CC is broken into three parts. Part 1 provides an introduction, Part 2 outlines
security functional components and Part 3 presents the security assurance components.
Additionally the CEM, an accompanying document to the CC, provides guidance for an
evaluator to conduct and evaluation based on the CC. This research focuses on CC Part 2
and providing the basis for security functional requirements expressed in a protection
profile or security target. A protection profile is defined as an implementation
independent security needs statement while a security target is an implementation
dependent statement of security needs. The security requirements expressed in Part 2 are
intended to counter threats in the operating environment and to be used to create trusted
products meeting user needs. As user security requirements change, the functional
requirements in the CC document may also change. [19]
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The Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, Security
Standards for Cryptographic Modules is used by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology to specify the security requirements that must be satisfied by cryptographic
modules used to protect sensitive, but unclassified, information. Requirements for more
restrictive information are not addressed in this thesis. FIPS 140-2 covers requirements
that relate to the design and implementation of a secure module. For additional
requirements related to specific functions within a cryptographic module a list of cross
referenced documents are provided within the standard. These additional requirements
will be noted in this thesis, but not addressed in detail. [20]
Thus far standards mentioned have applied generically to secure IT systems or to
classical cryptographic systems. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute
(ETSI) has been in the process of developing and releasing a set of five standards
documents that apply specifically to QKD systems. They are Components and Internal
Interfaces, Module Security Specification, Security Proofs, Use Cases and Application
Interface.
The Security Proofs standard examines the generic requirements for quantum
security proofs and serves as a reference for developing evaluation criteria. The main
themes of the Security Proofs document examine two key challenges to quantum security
proofs. They are: the subtlety in security definitions of a quantum cryptographic protocol
and the challenges to enforce assumptions in a practical QKD system. Specifically, the
Security Proofs standard intends to:
1) “Make precise the nature of the security claim, including its statistical
component”
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2) “List meaningful restrictions of adversarial action”
3) “Clarify the difference between security claim of a protocol (based on models)
and the security claim of its implementation”
4) “To carefully list all the usual components of a QKD protocol with their critical
characterizations.” [5]
The specific nature of this document makes evaluating QKD security more
straight forward than previous and more generic standards discussed, but a difference
between ideal and implementation, between generic requirements and specific limitations
of an operating environment, are still a major concern. This will be true of the other two
ETSI standards as well. In face the Security Proofs standards specifically does not “give
specific parameters for successful QKD as these numbers change with time” or “endorse
particular proofs [5].”
Module Security Specification presents the requirements for QKD utilized as part
of a telecommunications security system. It establishes a set of minimum specifications
that QKD must fulfill based on eleven security aspects identified. Compliance with these
specifications is stated as “necessary but not sufficient” to ensure security. The document
does not consider varying security levels of degrees of sensitivity of information. The
purpose of the Module Security Specification document is to establish requirements that
will detect any system penetration with high probability. [4]
The Components and Internal Interfaces standard defines the properties of QKD
system components and internal interfaces. Specifically it catalogues relevant
requirements for interfaces between components commonly used in most QKD systems.
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This standard emphasizes the need for sufficient definitions of parameters, components
and operating conditions when implementing QKD. [6]
Finally, the Application Interface standard describes the interface between
security applications and key management and the Use Cases standard describes potential
implementations for QKD. [7]

2.5 Systems Engineering and Architecture
Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary, top down approach to realizing a
successful system. It is the business of integrating all disciplines and specialties into a
concerted and structured development process that addresses the entire lifecycle of a
problem [21].
Systems architecting is a sub skill of systems engineering. The architect is
responsible for organizing the system components, guiding principles and relationships
between components and the external environment. The fundamental purpose of systems
architecture is a successful mission or vision. The architecture itself is a means to an end
and should be tailored to fit the purpose. Formal systems architecture is designed to
promote interoperability and support decision-making processes and solutions [22].
Systems engineering and systems architecture processes often go hand in hand
and are particularly useful for emerging technology such as QKD due to their
interdisciplinary nature and use of best practices over the entire lifecycle of a project.
Applying architectural rigor to defining a system visualizes the practical implementation
aspects and allows the user and architect to work together to decide upon the level of
abstraction most useful in a tailored analysis.
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The US Federal Government has established several laws and policies
encouraging the use of architectures in support of decisions [23,24,25,26,27,28]. The
formalized framework developed to meet federal guidance is the Department of Defense
Architecture Framework Version 2.0 (DoDAF V2.0). “DoDAF is the structure for
organizing architecture concepts, principles, assumptions, and terminology about
operations and solutions into meaningful patterns to satisfy specific DoD purposes [22].”
The structure visualization is achieved via models, which consist of documents,
spreadsheets or graphical representations, and serve to provide a template for organizing
data in a way that is easier to understand. These individual models, when populated, are
referred to as views. Several views comprise a viewpoint and viewpoints comprise the
architectural description. DoDAF V2.0 also allows for user-defined views to be created
as necessary that allow data to be presented via agency specific methods or preferences.
The specific visualization used is less important than the data that is collected, organized,
and stored and as such the models are not prescribed, but rather the data contained within.
This allows for greater tailorability and the freedom to create and scope architectures that
meet user requirements. DoDAF V2.0 enumerates eight viewpoints shown in Figure 2 to
select from when organizing data. [22]
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Systems Viewpoint
Articulate the legacy systems or independent
systems, their composition, interconnectivity and
context for providing for, or supporting, DoD
functions

Project Viewpoint

Services Viewpoint
Articulate the performers, activities, services and
their exchanges providing for, or supporting, DoD
functions

Describes the relationships between operational and capability requirements and the
various projects being implemented; Details dependencies between capability
management and the Defense Acquisition System process.

Operational Viewpoint
Articulate operational scenarios, processes, activities
& requirements

Standards Viewpoint

Articulate applicable Operational, Business, Technical, and Industry policy, standards,
guidance, constraints, and forecasts

Data and Information Viewpoint

All Viewpoint

Overarching aspects of architecture context that relate to all views

Articulate the data relationships and alignment structure in the architecture content

Capability Viewpoint
Articulate the capability requirement, delivery timing
and deployed capability

Figure 2. Architecture Viewpoints in DoDAF V2.0 [22]

The All Viewpoint contains information relevant to the entire architectural
description. The scope, time frame, and setting provide a context for the description and
can include conditions such as goals, vision, doctrine, procedures, etc. Within the All
Viewpoint are the Overview and Summary Information view which describes the vision,
goals, and conditions, and the Integrated Dictionary view, which provides a repository of
definitions for all terms.
The Capability Viewpoint provides a strategic context for capabilities. It presents
the goals associated with the ability to achieve desired effects through tasks. The models
in this viewpoint are high level and meant to communicate the strategic vision and
capabilities to decision makers. Within the Capability Viewpoint are seven individual
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views or models that an architect may choose to develop. The Vision model provides the
overall vision and context described at a high level. The Capability Taxonomy model
gives a hierarchy of capabilities. The Capability Phasing model shows planned capability
achievement at various periods of time and conditions. The Capabilities Dependencies
model describes dependencies and logical grouping of capabilities to be used for
identification purposes as well as impact analysis, disposal and other management
functions. The Capability to Organizational Development Mapping model provides
planned capability deployment and solutions. The Capability to Operational Activities
Mapping model maps required capabilities to operational activities. The Capability to
Services Mapping model links capabilities to the services they enable.
The Data and Information Viewpoint organizes business information
requirements and structural process rules. It consists of three views: Conceptual Data
Model, Logical Data Model, and Physical Data Model. The Conceptual Data Model view
gives high level information concepts such as information items, entities, attributes and
relationships. The Logical Data Model view documents data requirements and activity
rules. While specific format is not specified, this may be done with a class or object
diagram. The Physical Data Model view documents how data elements in the Logical
Data Model may be implemented and is often described utilizing class or object
diagrams.
The Operational Viewpoint describes organizations, tasks and activities that must
be performed to accomplish the mission. There are nine views within the Operational
Viewpoint. The High Level Operational Concept Graphic is a graphical and textual
concept description. The Operational Resource Flow Description shows resource flow
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between activities. The Operational Resource Flow Matrix describes both resources
exchanged and their attributes. The Organizational Relationships Chart provides role
relationships and context between organizations involved in the mission. The Operational
Activity Decomposition Tree organizes operational activities into a hierarchy. The
Operational Activity Model provides context to operational activities and their inputs and
outputs. The Operational Rules Model identifies business rules that provide operational
constraints. The State Transition Description illustrates operational activities and their
responses to events. The Event-Trace Description traces a sequence of events in a
scenario.
The Project Viewpoint contains three views that document the organizational
relationships between programs. The Project Portfolio Relationships view describes
dependency between organizations and projects. The Project Timelines view gives a
timeline with key milestones and interdependencies. The Project to Capability Mapping
view maps programs to capabilities to show how the elements achieve capability.
The Services Viewpoint uses 13 views to describe system, service and
interconnection functionality. The Services Context Description provides the composition
and interaction of services while incorporating the human element. The Services
Resource Flow Description lists resource flow between services. The Systems-Services
Matrix shows the relationship between systems and their services. The Services-Services
Matrix shows the relationships between services. The Services Functionality Description
provides functions performed by each service and activities between them. The
Operational Activity to Services Traceability Matrix maps service activities to
operational activities. The Services Resource Flow Matrix shows elements being
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exchanged between services and the attributes. The Services Measures Matrix provides
metrics of service elements. The Services Evolution Description lists planned steps for
evolving services. The Services Technology and Skills Forecast describes emerging
technologies and skills that may be available during the project timeframe. The Services
Rules Model describes services functionality by enumerating design or implementation
constraints. The Services State Transition Description illustrates service functionality by
identifying service responses to events. The Services Event-Trace Description describes
services functionality by providing service relevant specifics to critical event sequences.
The Standards Viewpoint contains two views that capture the minimal rules
governing system parts or elements as individuals or part of the system. This is the
viewpoint that will enumerate the applicable technical and engineering implementation
guidelines. The Standards Profile lists current standards and the Standards Forecast
describes emerging standards that may apply during project timelines.
The Systems Viewpoint describes the supporting automated systems,
interconnectivity, and functionality using 13 views. The Systems Interface Description
shows systems and interconnections. The Systems Resource Flow Description shows
resource flow between systems. The Systems-Systems Matrix shows relationships of
interest such as interfaces between systems. The System Functionality Description
describes activities and data flows among systems. The Operational Activity to Systems
Function Traceability Matrix maps system activities to operational activities. The
Operational Activities to System Traceability Matrix maps the systems to operational
activities. The Systems Resource Flow Matrix provides system to system resource flow
exchange elements and attributes. The Systems Measures Matrix lists metrics for model
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elements. The Systems Evolution Description describes planned steps for an evolving
suite of systems. The Systems Technology and Skills Forecast provides technologies and
skill emerging within the project timeline. The Systems Rules Model describes systems
functionality by identifying constraints due to design or implementation. The Systems
State Transition Description describes system functionality by identifying responses to
events. This is often illustrated by a state machine diagram. The Systems Event-Trace
Description describes system functionality by providing a system specific view for
critical the operational sequences. [22]
In addition to the viewpoint guidelines above, architectures may incorporate
several fit-for-purpose views. For example, a block diagram or various UML techniques
may be appropriate ways of representing a system within an IT industry context.
Whichever model chosen to comprise an architectural definition, there are six key steps
to follow [29]:
1. Determine Intended Use of Architecture
2. Determine Scope
3. Determine Supporting Data Required
4. Collect, Organize, Correlate, and Store Data
5. Conduct Analysis in Support of Objectives
6. Document Results for Decision Maker Needs

2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter provided a review of key literature applicable to QKD
research. It gave a general overview of QKD development and discusses ten published
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papers that will be analyzed in Chapter 4. Additionally it reviewed the four IT security
standards that will be addressed: Department of Defense Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria [18], Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation[19], Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules[20], and the five
ETSI documents [2,4,5,6,7]. Finally, this chapter provided an overview of DoDAF v2.0
architecture guidelines [22].
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III. Methodology

3.1 Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to present a methodology and approach for
addressing the research questions. It will discuss Content Analysis and describe the
method used for data collection. It will also describe the development of the standards
matrix evaluation criteria and discuss the architectural process by which the prototypical
QKD system will be developed.

3.2 Research Strategy
Content analysis is used to determine the presence of words or concepts within
text. It allows a researcher to quantify the presence of such concepts formally or
informally or as broadly or specifically as the researcher decides. A content analysis calls
for a text to be broken down into manageable categories and then examined using one of
the basic content analysis methods. The content analysis methods chosen for this research
is conceptual analysis, which quantifies the presence, either implicit or explicit, of a
specified concept within a text [36].

3.3 Data Collection
Conceptual analysis begins with identifying the research questions to be answer
and determining what text will be analyzed. Once selected the text must be broken into
content categories and then analyzed for specified concepts [36]. This analysis seeks to
determine whether existing QKD research considers security standards. Based on the
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research question and selected methodology, an approach for determining the use of IT
security standards in QKD research is developed here.
The content to be analyzed is drawn from published QKD research papers. There
have been a great many papers published on this topic. This research attempts to analyze
a cross sampling of papers published from the 1980s to present time and does so by
breaking the content into three main categories: earlier concepts for QKD
implementation when less work had been done towards making it a commercially viable
concept, different possible implementations and uses, known security vulnerabilities in
practical QKD implementations. From these three categories, 10 papers were chosen for
review.
The next step in the research is to specify the concepts to be identified in the
coding scheme. The concepts were drawn from IT security standards documents. There
are many standards documents present to select from; however, for this research four
main documents were used to develop the criteria. These four standards are chosen based
on general applicability to both secure IT and cryptographic systems and to QKD.
To determine concepts to be analyzed, each standard requirement is examined,
not as detailed specifications but rather as general criteria against several published QKD
papers to see if standard security requirements were considered by the authors. Coding is
done based on a “met,” “partially met,” or “does not meet” basis. For example, the
security requirement to authenticate will not be considered met or not met based on a
detailed explanation of how authentication was accomplished in each set up examined.
Instead, if the author makes mention of the need to have an authentication mechanism,
the requirement will be considered met and annotated with an “x.” If the requirement was
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explicitly met in its entirety the matrix be annotated with an “x*.” This research primarily
evaluates whether standards criteria were considered, not whether the system presented is
considered a complete security validation. It would be infeasible given the focus and
brevity of most published QKD literature to expect a complete published security profile;
however, it is important to consider certain concepts in discussing any secure
cryptographic system. With a generalist attitude in mind, security criteria and their
interpreted applicability to this research and for potential QKD systems are discussed
here and an analysis of criteria conceptualized in literature will be presented in Chapter 4.
From the department of defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria,
the Common Criteria, the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3,
and the ETSI QKD Standards a top level list of minimum considerations was
consolidated into a standards matrix. A brief explanation of each of the criteria chosen for
review follows.
The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria will be analyzed in four main
categories: Security Policy, Accountability, Assurance and Documentation. The security
policy consists of four main sub areas which are discretionary access control, object
reuse, labeling, and mandatory access control. Discretionary access control requires that
access be defined and controlled between users and objects. Object reuse requires
information within a storage object be revoked prior to assignment to a subject. Labeling
requires that sensitivity labels be assigned to each resource that is accessible outside the
system.
Accountability defines ten sub categories for the scope of this research:
identification and authentication, audit, system architecture, system integrity, covert
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channel analysis, trusted recovery, security testing, design specification and verification,
configuration management, and trusted distribution. Identification and authentication
specifies requirements for users to identify themselves prior to performing any actions.
Audit requirements demand that an audit trail be created, maintained and protected for all
relevant events. The system architecture requires that the system domain be maintained
for its own execution and be protected from tampering. System integrity determines if
there are hardware/software features that may be used to validate correct operations.
Covert channel analysis requires a bandwidth determination of each channel identified.
Trusted recovery allows the system to recover without compromise after a system failure.
Security testing provides proof that the system security mechanisms have been tested.
Design specification and verification presents a formal, top level model of the system
security policy. Configuration management requires a control of changes to descriptive
top-level specification, design data, documentation and code for all security relevant
hardware, firmware, and software. Trusted distribution requires a trusted system control
and distribution facility to maintain integrity between the master data and the on-site
copy.
Assurance criteria require that hardware and software provides assurance that
security requirements are enforced. This may be accomplished by developing a system
architecture that defines the system domain and hardware/software integrity.
Documentation criteria can be sub divided into two categories for this research:
test documentation and design documentation. Test documentation specifies a test plan
with procedures showing how security mechanisms are tested and stating their results.
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Design documentation provides the manufacturer’s philosophy of protection. This may
include interfaces between modules, security policies and protection mechanisms. [18]
The Common Criteria Standards, being designed to cover a large variety of
systems, enumerates many requirements to be met by secure systems. For the purposes of
this research, these standards have been summarized by addressing the key concepts
presented within the documents, rather than the many specific requirements. The major
areas addressed by the Common Criteria that this research will review are: Security
Audit; Non-Repudiation; Cryptographic Key Management to include generation,
distribution, access and destruction; User Data Protection; Identification and
Authentication; Security Management; Privacy; Resource Utilization; User Session
Access; and Trusted Paths/Channels. A brief discussion of each follows.
Security audits require the generation of data capable of being audited. As such a
secure system should be able to record, store and select event data relevant to the security
of a system. What this data is and how it is generated, stored and selected should be
specified. Additionally, the methods and policies for analysis and the responses to any
potential security violation should be specified.
Non-repudiation requires some mechanism in place to ensure that a sender cannot
deny sending a transmission and a receiver cannot deny having received it. This includes
the identification of the user, the information transmitted, the destination, and the
invocation of a non-repudiation service.
Cryptographic Key Management refers to how cryptographic keys are managed
throughout their lifecycle. The lifecycle of a cryptographic key covers its generation,
distribution, access, and eventual destruction. Each of these tasks is required to be done
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in accordance with a specified method and applicable standard. For key generation an
algorithm, key size and standard should be given. For key distribution, access, and
destruction the method and standard should be stated. The Common Criteria includes
requirements for cryptographic operations as well; however, the focus of most QKD
systems to date is managing the key itself, not the functions performed utilizing that key.
While it will be important to consider cryptographic operations when implementing in the
larger context, it is not a particular concern in simply developing a QKD module to
manage cryptographic keys and so the operations portion of this criteria is acknowledged,
but not emphasized in this research with a place in the standards matrix.
User data protection includes the requirements related to protected user data
during import export and storage of information. It also specifies any security attributes
that relate to user data. This may include access control functions and policies that relate
to this requirement.
Identification and authentication establishes requirements to verify user identities.
Many other security attributes as well as the security of the entire QKD system rely on
the ability to determine that Alice is in fact Alice and Bob is in fact Bob. To meet this
critical requirement, mechanisms should be specified that not only authenticate a user’s
identity but also declare how to handle authentication failures, and quality metrics.
Security management encompasses the management of security roles, attributes,
functions and data. Security management also includes revocation of security attributes
for entities as well as attribute expiration, or enforcing time limits on security attributes.
This specifies the attributes to be managed and by whom, the time limits restricting them
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and the actions to be taken in the event that requirements are not met or time limits
expire.
Privacy requirements are designed to provide the user with protection against
identity discovery and misuse. Privacy ensures that a user may use the system without
publicly releasing their identity, but can still be accountable for that use. It also ensures
that a user may use a resource without it being publicly known that the resource is in use.
Protection of the Target of Evaluation Security Functionality involves protecting
QKD system security functionality. Many mechanisms appear to duplicate user data
protection requirements, but the consideration for the criteria emphasizes protecting
security function data. This requirement considers the implementation and external data
that governs security functions as well as any external entities that may be required to
enforce security functional requirements. Examples of specific considerations for this
requirement are assuring the availability, confidentiality and integrity of exported data,
trusted recovery, fail safe functions, and time stamps.
Resource utilization specifies three main concepts: fault tolerance, priority of
service and resource allocation. Fault tolerance ensures that the system continues to
function despite failures. It requires that failures can be detected and that system
capabilities are maintained or, depending on the failure, the system is shut down. Priority
of service allows users to prioritize tasks. Resource allocation prevents a denial of service
occurring due to monopolization of resources. In other words, a minimum amount of
resources are always reserved for priority tasks.
User session access enumerates the functional requirements for establishing a user
session. This may include functions relating to limiting selectable attributes for user
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sessions, limiting the number of user sessions, session locking, session establishment,
session termination, and access history. This may also include any warning banners
designed to notify users of appropriate uses of the system.
The final conceptual requirement from the Common Criteria addressed in this
research is trusted paths and channels. This requirement accounts for trusted path
between the user and the system as well as between the system and other IT products. To
be a trusted path, the channel generally isolates a subset of data and commands from the
rest of the data and can provide assurance that the user is communicating with the right
system and the system is communicating with the right user. [19]
FIPS Publication 140-2 contains 11 main security requirements governing
cryptographic modules: cryptographic module specification; cryptographic module ports
and interfaces; roles, services, and authentication; finite state model; physical security;
operational environment; cryptographic key management; electromagnetic interference
and compatibility; self-tests; design assurance; mitigation of other attacks. In Chapter 4,
each of these will be examined to see if the intent of these criteria are met in part or in
full by the literature presented. Following is a brief explanation of what is meant by each
FIPS 140-2 requirement chosen for the purposes of the standards matrix presented in this
paper.
A complete cryptographic module specification includes a detailed accounting of
all hardware, software and firmware. It also includes specification of the cryptographic
boundary, the security policies, algorithms and approved modes of operation.
Cryptographic module ports and interfaces require the specification of all
interfaces for input and output data paths. Depending on the level of security required in
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the module, it may also require data ports for critical security parameters to be separate
from other ports.
Roles, services and authentication refer to the need for identity based operator
authentication. In this case, the primary operators would be Alice and Bob and this
requirement is primarily addressing the need for an authentication mechanism as part of
the operating protocol. Additionally, services to be specified in a cryptographic module
include showing status, performing self-tests, and performing approved security
functions.
A cryptographic module should include finite state model. The finite state model
should address all operational and error states of the module as well as any transitions
between states. Input and output events that result in or from transitions should be
specified. At a minimum the model requires on/off states, crypto officer states such as
key management and initialization, key entry states, user states, self-test states, and error
states.
Physical security encompasses all mechanisms that restrict unauthorized physical
access. Mechanisms may include automatic zeroization, tamper detection and responses.
Additionally this includes environmental failure protection which protects against
environmental conditions and fluctuations whether accidental or induced. As part of this
requirement, documentation should specify the normal operating ranges of the module.
The operational environment includes the hardware, firmware and software
required to operate the cryptographic module. The operating system is a key feature of
the operational environment. Like many of the criteria addressed here, each security level
has its own requirements for the operational environment.
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Cryptographic key management like in the Common Criteria refers to key
management over the entire lifecycle of the cryptographic key. This includes random
number and key generation, key establishment, key distribution, key entry/output, key
storage, and key zeroization.
Electromagnetic interference and compatibility requires documentation meeting
standards put forth in 47 Code of Federal Regulations.
Self-tests should be documented for secure cryptographic modules. They include
two main types, power-up tests and conditional tests. Power-up tests occur whenever the
module is powered up and conditional tests are required whenever a security function is
invoked. Conditional tests may include pairwise consistency tests for public and private
keys, software/firmware load tests, manual key entry tests, continuous random number
generator tests and bypass tests. Test documentation should include successes and
failures as well as any conditions and actions needed to re-enter normal operations.
Design assurance refers to use of best practice for configuration management,
development, delivery and operation and guidance for the user and crypto officer.
Configuration management mandates that the functional requirements and specifications
are met when a system is implemented. It requires that the module, module components
within the cryptographic boundary and all associated documentation have a configuration
number. Design assurance during development means assurance that the implementation
corresponds to the security policy and functional specification. Delivery and operation
means ensuring that the module is securely delivered to authorized users and is correctly
installed and implemented. Finally, the guidance provides warnings and instructions for
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use as well as guidance on how to administer the module such as assumptions, security
parameters, and administrative functions.
Mitigation of other attacks covers any attacks for which there were no security
requirements known when the standards were published. This is of particular importance
in QKD given the uniqueness of the technology and relatively limited commercial field
time. When considering mitigation of other attacks the cryptographic module’s security
policy should specify security mechanisms used. These mechanisms will be validated as
requirements and appropriate tests are developed. [20]
The ETSI QKD standards documents released in recent years consist of five parts:
Application Interface, Components and Internal Interface, Module Security Specification,
Security Proofs, and Use Cases. For the purpose of this research, we will focus primarily
on the Module Security Specification which enumerates a number of specific security
requirements for QKD. The standards matrix pulls all documentation requirements from
this module and examines each requirement individually to see if it has been met. To a
less specific extent, but no less important, requirements from the other four standards are
addressed. The Components and Interface standard acknowledge that while different
implementations of QKD possess different components, there are some that are most
commonly used. These components are defined in terms of parameters, operating
conditions, and component configuration where possible. From this, three general
requirements for parameters, operating conditions and defining components will be added
to the standards matrix. The Application Interface describes the key management layer
that de-multiplexes secure bits into separate groups and passes to their associated
applications. The Security Proofs standard is not represented in the standards matrix
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explicitly. While incredibly useful in developing a QKD system and understanding the
assumption and principles on which its security is based, the philosophy required by this
standard is covered in requirements elsewhere [2,4,5,6,7]

3.4 QKD Architecture
The architectural framework that will be utilized for this research is the DoDAF
V2.0 discussed in Chapter 2. DoDAF V2.0 is the framework guidance proposed for DoD
managers and process owners to specify requirements and control development. The
development is a six step process:
1. Determine Intended Use of Architecture
2. Determine Scope
3. Determine Supporting Data Required
4. Collect, Organize, Correlate, and Store Data
5. Conduct Analysis in Support of Objectives
6. Document Results for Decision Maker Needs [29]
This thesis will attempt to demonstrate a basic prototypical framework for a QKD system
that utilizes industry standards as the primary requirements considerations for a new
technology, not a complete working implementation. In depth analysis of specific system
implementations is left for future research. As such, the architecture presented here will
not present a complete meta-model, but rather utilize DoDAF v2.0 guidelines to produce
several top level architectural viewpoints that best illustrate IT security standards
practices.
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3.5 Summary
This chapter presented a methodology and approach for addressing the research
questions. It discussed Content Analysis and described the method used for data
collection. It also described the development of the standards matrix evaluation criteria
and discussed the architectural process by which the prototypical QKD system will be
developed.
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IV. Analysis and Results

4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter will present the completed matrix and architecture.

4.2 Standards Matrix
The fully populated standards matrix is sparse, which is not an unexpected result
considering the published research surveyed addressed either general concerns for
implementing QKD or very specific vulnerabilities. Most of the positive results where
published papers are determined to have addressed standards criteria in the matrix only
partially or indirectly acknowledge them as requirements. Most of the literature did not
attempt to formalize them. There were no specified or derived criteria in the matrix that
were entirely addressed by the surveyed literature. The specific positive results of the
standards matrix are explained below.
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Table 1. Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Matrix

Security Policy: Discretionary Access Control
Security Policy: Object Reuse
Security Policy: Labels
Security Policy: Mandatory Access Control
Orange Book Accountability: Identification and Authentication
("Department Accountability: Audit
of Defense Assurance: System Architecture
Trusted
Accountability: System Integrity
Computer Accountability: Covert Channel Analysis
System
Accountability: Trusted Recovery
Evaluation Accountability: Security Testing
Criteria, 1983) Accountability: Design Specification and Verification
Accountability: Configuration Management
Accountability: Trusted Distribution
Documentation: Test Documentation
Documentation: Design Documentation

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x
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Table 2. Common Criteria Matrix

Security Audit
Communication: Non-Repudiation
Cryptographic Key Management: Generation
Cryptographic Key Management: Distribution
Cryptographic Key Management: Access
Cryptographic Key Management: Destruction
Common
User Data Protection
Criteria
Identification and Authentication
Security Management
Privacy
Resource Utilisation
TOE Access: User Session Access
Trusted Path/Channels
x

x
x
x
x

x
x

x

Cryptographic Module Specification
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces
Roles, Services, and Authentication
Federal Information Finite State Model
Processing Standards Physical Security
Publication 140-2, Operational Environment
Security Standards for Cryptographic Key Management
Cryptographic Modules Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility
Self-Tests
Design Assurance
Mitigation of Other Attacks
x

x

x
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x

x

x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x

x
x

x

x

x

x

x
x

x
x

x
x

Table 3. Security Standards for Cryptographic Modules Matrix

x

x

x

x
x
x
x
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Table 4. ETSI Matrix

Parameters Defined
x
Operating Conditions Defined
Components Defined
Specification of the hardware
and software configuration
items
Specification of any hardware
or software configuration items
of a QKD module that are
excluded from the security
requirements
Specification of the physical
ports and logical interfaces.
Specification of the manual or
logical controls, status
indicators, and applicable
physical, logical, and electrical
characteristics.
List of all security functions,
both Approved and nonApproved, specification of all
modes of operation
Block diagram depicting all of
the major hardware
components
Specification of the design of
the hardware and software.
Specification of all securityrelated information whose
disclosure or modification can
compromise the security.
Specification of a Security
Policy
ETSI QKD Specification of the physical
Standards ports and logical interfaces and
all defined input and output
data paths.
Specification of all authorized
roles supported.
Specification of the services,
operations, or functions
provided, both Approved and
non-Approved
Specification of any services
provided for which the operator
is not required to assume an
authorized role
Specification of the
authentication mechanisms
x
supported
Documentation shall specify
which approved software
integrity techniques are used.
Documentation shall specify
the MSI commands employed.

x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Specification of the operational
environment.
Specification of the physical
security mechanisms that are
employed.
Specification of the
maintenance access interface
and how plaintext secret and
private keys and other CSPs
are to be zeroized when the
maintenance access interface
is accessed.

x

38

x

x

x

x

x

If split knowledge
procedures are used,
proof that if knowledge
of n key components is
required to reconstruct
the original key, then
knowledge that any n-1
key components
provides no information
about the original key
other than the key's
length.
Specification of the SSP
storage methods.
Specification of the SSP
zeroization methods.
Specification of selftests.
Specification of the error
states.
Specification of all
security functions critical
to the secure
operationand
identification of the
applicable preoperational, conditional,
and critical functions
tests.
If a QKD module
implements a bypass
capability, specification
of the mechanism or
logic governing the
switching procedure.
Specification of
procedures for secure
installation, generation,
and start-up.
Specification of the
procedures for
maintaining security
while distributing and
delivering.
Specification of the
correspondence
between the design of
the hardware/software of
a QKD module and the
Security Policy.
If a QKD module
contains software,
specification of the
source code for the
ETSI QKD software.
Standards If a cryptographic
module contains
hardware, specification
of the schematics and/or
the HDL listings for the
hardware.
Functional specification
that informally describes
a QKD module.

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x
Specification of a formal
model that describes the
rules and characteristics
of the Security Policy.
Specification of a
rationale that
demonstrates the
consistency and
completeness of the
formal model with
respect to the Security
Policy.
Specification of an
informal proof of the
correspondence
between the formal
model and the functional
specification.
For each
hardware/software
component, source code
annotation with
comments.
Specification of an
informal proof of the
correspondence
between the design of
the QKD module and the
functional specification.
Cryptographic Officer
guidance
User guidance
If a QKD module is
designed to mitigate one
or more specific attacks,
specification of security
mechanisms employed
to mitigate the attack(s).
x
Definition of QKD
Module Security Policy
Specification of a
Cryptographic Module
Security Policy

x

x

x
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Specification of the
normal operating
ranges. Specification
of the environmental
failure protection
features.
Specification of the
mitigation techniques
against applicable
Timing Analysis
attacks.
Specification of the
mitigation techniques
against applicable
SPA attacks.

x

x

x

Specification of the
mitigation techniques
against applicable
DPA attacks.
Specification of the
ETSI QKD mitigation techniques
Standards against applicable
EME attacks.
Specification of all
cryptographic keys,
cryptographic key
components.
Specification of each
RBG (Approved
RBGs and nonApproved RBG
entropy sources).
Specification of each
of the key generation
methods (Approved
and non-Approved). x
Specification of the
key establishment
x
methods.
Specification of the
key entry and output
methods.

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

The first paper analyzed using the standards matrix is [8]. As one of the earlier
papers presenting the possibility of a practical QKD system, the authors effectively
present several key concepts to consider. The primary concern is the protocol used to
generate and distribute the cryptographic key. To present this then novel idea, the authors
presented a scheme, known today as the BB84 protocol, to generate and transmit enough
random bits through a quantum channel to serve as a one-time pad. Bennett and Brassard
also provided a basic test for eavesdropping via bit agreement and suggested that an
eavesdropper would cause a 25% bit error rate. Additionally, the authors recommended
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utilizing a Wegman-Carter [31] authentication tag for messages over the public channel
to prevent active eavesdropping. The authentication tag would create a trusted channel,
which the Common Criteria defines as “a communication channel that may be initiated
by either side of the channel, and provides non-repudiation characteristics with respect to
the identity of the sides of the channel.” Given this definition, Trusted Path/Channels
were also partially addressed by mention of authentication requirements. In total 12 out
of 95, or 12.6% of the criteria included in the standards matrix were partially addressed
by this proposed system.
The 1991 paper “Experimental Quantum Cryptography” presented results for the
first experimental QKD channel. Like the 1984 paper above it stated the need for a public
channel authentication scheme and presented a basic key generation and distribution
protocol. The 1991 also paper proposed a specific method for randomness and presented
a physical description of the apparatus while defining some of the required parameters
and operating conditions. The experimental set up addressed two specific QKD attacks:
intercept/resend and beam splitting as well has how to determine the information leaked
if exploited. Finally, it presented test results to see if results are as expected [9]. In total,
22 of 95, or 23.2% of the examined criteria were partially addressed in some form.
In “Quantum Key Distribution over 122 km of Standard Telecom Fiber” the
authors presented a basic set up of the quantum module. There was no description of the
classical channel included. The paper addressed causes of error including physical
imperfections in the system. As a result, error rates are parameterized. Furthermore, this
paper discussed a pulse splitting attack and method to mitigate [10]. These key points
partially considered 8 of 95, or 8.4% of the standards requirements.
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“Has Quantum Cryptography Been Proven Secure” asserted that additional
engineering rigor is required before QKD can be declared secure. It presented a
discussion of various QKD assertions and the impact of specific attacks. It does not
however, propose a specific system or address any security criteria other than specifying
attacks [13]. As a result, on 1 of 95 or 1.1% of the criteria were addressed in this paper.
“Optical Networking for Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum
Communications” provided a look at how we would utilize existing fiber infrastructures
to implement QKD. Key properties and parameters addressed in this paper were traffic
distribution, bit rate, wavelength and power levels. Environmental effects were
considered. Software was mentioned, but not elaborated upon and standard QKD
protocols such as error correction, privacy amplification and authentication were
addressed. Auto-synchronization was also presented. Finally, a basic network diagram
was explained [12]. These key discussion points addressed 16 of 95, or 16.8% of the
criteria analyzed.
A paper covering implementing a satellite outlined the basic cryptographic key
process in a section under system configuration which provided a basic implementation
diagram wherein Alice was the transmitter, Bob the receiver and satellites act as trusted
nodes. Several parameters were identified, most notably wavelength, timing/precision,
phase, intensity, key rate and Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER). Randomness was handled
through passive basis selection. Environmental concerns and the effects of background
noise and attenuation were addressed. Further, the need to synchronize systems and
implement mechanisms for systems leaving their stated parameters was noted. Processing
overhead on the classical channel was a concern and channel performance was analyzed.
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Finally, a decoy state protocol was proposed to mitigate specific vulnerabilities [11]. In
total, these stated concerns, while not completely developed in a formal specification,
lead to this paper addressing 22 out of 95 or 23.2% of the criteria.
“After-gate Attack on a Quantum Cryptosystem” addressed criteria by discussing
various known attacks, how to mitigate them and identified the parameters and timing
issues required. In particular, this paper addressed the component parameters of an
Avalanche Photo Diode which is the most common type of Single Photon Detector used
in QKD [14]. This considers 5 of 95 or 5.3% of the criteria.
“Information Leakage via Side Channels” was the second of the specific
vulnerability papers and as such provided a discussion of the vulnerability associated
with side channels. Additionally, it presented an informal sketch of the physical set up
and an explanation of the cryptographic key protocol with accounting for a digital
calibration of light pulses. Parameters specified included wavelength, APD efficiency,
jitter, and some test parameters for lasers [15]. These specifics imply consideration for 9
of 95, or 9.5% of the criteria.
“Time-Shift in Practical Quantum Cryptosystems” discussed how to exploit an
imperfection in the efficiency of single photon detectors, which are components typically
used in QKD. In doing so, the paper discussed synchronization, provided a partial sketch
of the physical system and declared use of BB84 protocol for key generation and
distribution [16]. These key points addressed 10 of 95 or 10.5% of the criteria.
The final paper, “Effects of Detector Efficiency Mismatch on Security of
Quantum Cryptosystems” focused on the photon number splitting attack while specifying
BB84 protocol for key generation and distribution. Due to the attack focus most
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parameters discussed are for single photon detectors: experimental detector sensitivity
results, wavelength requirements, and quantum bit error rate. Additionally this paper
discussed the set of all possible input signals and how to respond, including responses to
failure/input outside expected parameters [17]. It partially discussed 15 of 95, or 15.7%
of standards criteria.
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Figure 3, Security Standards Matrix Summary

Figure 3 above, summarizes the results of the content analysis. This answers the
question: To what extent do published QKD systems meet security standards? It is seen
that while evidence of some security standards concepts investigated can be found in the
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published literature analyzed, no papers revealed a definitive discussion or emphasis on
the criteria. The best results addressed approximately 23% of the standards body of
knowledge.

4.3 QKD Architecture
This section will address the results of the architecture process outlined in Chapter
3. Step 1, Determine Intended Use of Architecture is addressed by the second research
question of this thesis. The purpose of the architecture is to determine how to develop a
prototypical systems architecture definition for future QKD development. Particularly, it
will be tailored reflect the security standards requirements examined in this thesis, as well
as identify critical components, primary functions, and non-idealities to the system.
With this overarching purpose in mind, we move on to Step 2, Determine Scope.
The architecture contained within this section is scoped to also primarily address the
research questions discussed in Chapter 1. Rather than developing a complete meta
model, only views deemed most important are presented in this chapter. The information
is kept sufficiently high level to avoid issues associated with the multiple methods for
implementing QKD, but detailed enough to provide researchers a guideline for
implementation considerations. First and foremost, this architecture is meant to highlight
concepts and process that should be applied to future development. Both the Use and the
Scope of the architecture are addressed in a DoDAF AV-1 model below in Table 5.
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Table 5. AV-1
This AV-1 is an executive-level summary of the (QKD) architecture. This initial version of the AV-1
focuses the architecture development effort by documenting the scope and intended usage.
Architecture Project Identification
Name

Assumptions
and
Constraints

Approval Authority

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Architecture
The QKD architecture:
• Will make maximum use of DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF v.0) and
SysML/UML products with changes made as necessary
• Will be tailored for maximum design flexibility and usefulness
• Will use only optical and electrical hardware components that are currently
available
• Will use software (e.g. operating systems, classical communications protocol,
etc.) that is currently available.
• Will emphasize industry security standards.
•
•

AFIT, Department of Systems Engineering Management
AFIT, Department of Computer and Electrical Engineering

Date Completed

Feb 2012

LOE and Costs

Level of effort will be consistent with Master’s Thesis requirements.
Scope: Architecture View(s) and Products Identification

Products Developed
Scope

Time Frames
Addressed

This QKD architecture consists of the set of integrated architecture products -AV-1, AV-2, SV-1, SV-10, StdV-2, Block Diagram, Use Cases, Fit-for-purpose
policy
The scope of the QKD architecture is to demonstrate how architectural definition
identifies functions, and technology that are required in order to successfully
develop a secure quantum key distribution system.
The QKD architecture would serve as the basis for further research and
development of QKD implementations.
Development of initial QKD architecture would realistically involve organizations
from the DoD as follows:

Organizations
Involved

•

Air Force Institute of Technology

•

Laboratory for Telecommunications Sciences

•

Sandia National Laboratory
Purpose and Viewpoint

Purpose

Questions to be
Answered

This architecture will provide a prototype for future research and
recommendations for a QKD system.
The following questions are considered critical to successful completion of the
architecting effort. The QKD architecture should be capable of sufficiently
answering how systems architecture definition provides a blueprint for future
QKD development. In particular:
a) What standards apply to QKD?
b) What are the main system functions?
c) What are the critical system components?
d) How do actual hardware components differ from the ideal system
assumed in the security proofs?
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Architecture
Viewpoint

The QKD architecture is developed primarily from DoDAF V2.0.
Context

Mission

Goals

QKD is a response by the scientific community to the threat posed by a
quantum computer to some traditional cryptographic algorithms. While the QKD
“algorithm” can be proven mathematically secure, this proof is based upon certain
assumptions about the hardware/software used to implement QKD. The actual
security provided by QKD will depend upon the physical implementation of the
QKD “algorithm” and how well real hardware/software matches the ideal
assumed in security proofs.
QKD is envisioned as a next generation cryptographic key distribution
system capitalizing on quantum mechanics principles to generate shared keys.
These shared key will be used as a One Time Pad or as shared symmetric secret
keys.
The goal of a QKD system is to allow two or more parties to share a secret.
• IT Standards for Secure Systems and Cryptographic Modules
• European Telecommunications Standards Institute
• National Institute of Standards and Technology

Rules, Criteria, and
Conventions
Followed

• Department of Defense
• Common Criteria
• Quantum Mechanics Principles
• Cryptographic Principles
• DoDAF v2.0 and AP233 (SysML) will be utilized in developing the system
architecture.
Tools and File Formats Used

Enterprise Architect v8.0, Microsoft; Word and Excel, Adobe Acrobat

In addition to the AV-1, Step 2 also begins the development of the AV-2 or
integrated dictionary. Throughout the architecture process it is important to keep a
common vocabulary. Terms should be collected and defined to clarify any ambiguity that
may arise from inconsistencies. A model dictionary is prepared from common terms
found in QKD below in Table 6. This is far from a complete listing of every component
and parameter possible, but is tailored to provide a reference point for terms presented
within the scope of this thesis. Additional parameters and components that should be
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included in an in depth dictionary and architecture are many and depend on the type of
implementation being defined.
By analyzing the data collected in the AV-1, a developer begins to understand
Step 3, Determine Supporting Data. The supporting data required is decided upon based
on the mission and project requirements outlined in the AV-1 during Step 2. This context
allows the architect to consider what additional views should be developed to organize
and catalogue this information. The information contained in the project overview
requires at a minimum this QKD architecture should include the AV-1 or project
overview itself, the AV-2 or integrated project dictionary, the OV-1 or concept graphic,
the SV-10 state transition diagram, StdV-1 or current applicable standards listing, a block
diagram, use cases, and a fit-for-purpose view. By developing these views or models, the
architecture will address the major requirements put forth in the standards studied both by
enumerating them in the StdV-1 standards listing and by reflecting them throughout the
architecture development as well as meet the additional objectives defined by the project.
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Table 6. AV-2
Object

Type

Description

Avalanche Photodiode

Component

Beam Splitter

Component

Buffers

Component

Classical Photo Detector
Classical/Public Channel

Component
Component

Clock
Control Electronics
Fiber

Component
Component
Component

Intensity Modulator
Interference Filter

Component
Component

Key Storage
Laser Pulse Generator

Component
Component

Memory
Phase/Signal Modulator
Power Supply
Quantum Channel

Component
Component
Component
Component

A device that transforms a weak optical signal into a (more) detectable signal with finite probability. The most
common type of Single Photon Detector.
Splits an optical pulse into two weaker (typically equal intensity) pulses. The reflected pulse undergoes a 90
degree phase shift.
The hardware and connections related to QKD buffers. This includes input/output buffers, plaintext/ciphertext
buffers and control buffers
A device that transforms an optical signal into an electrical signal.
A non-quantum transmission medium that is used to perform sifting, error correction, privacy amplification and
transmit initial authentication. It may consist of phone lines, radio, ethernet, or other classical media. In this
architecture, "classical channel" is assumed to be ethernet or fiber connected to a generic computer
communications network.
A device that provides timing pulses to the rest of the machine.
The physical components of the system controller.
Fiber Optic Cable made of optical fibers, usually glass filaments, that can transmit data in the form of light
pulses.
A device that can actively set the intensity of a photon pulse that is passing through it.
Reduces the intensity and spectral width of the laser pulse, typically to select a portion of the spectrum at which
the photodetectors have a high quantum efficiency
The hardware and connections used for key storage.
A quantum signal generator using laser pulses. Either a continuous wave laser that is pulsed by a switch, or a
pulsed laser (e.g. q-switched).
The hardware and connections used to provide working and program memory.
A device that alters the phase of a given pulse of light. This can be as simple as a small delay line.
The hardware and connections used to provide power to the system.
A communications channel for transmitting quantum signals. The physical medium varies based on system
implementation. For the purposes of this architecture, the quantum channel is assumed to be optical fiber.

Random Number
Generator/Random Bit
Generator
Single Photon
Generator/Quantum Signal
Generator
Alice
Bob
Classical Module

Component

A device that outputs unpredictable binary bit sequences. This can be accomplished using physical features
such as quantum noise.

Component

An optical source that emits, at most, one photon at a time. In practical implementations, a weak attenuated
pulse is substituted for a single photon generator.

Entity
Entity
Entity

Control Module
Quantum Module

Entity
Entity

Afterpulse

Parameter

Dark Count
Error Rate

Parameter
Parameter

Jitter
Authentication
Error Correction
Heralded Photons
Key Sifting/Distillation
Perfect Security

Parameter
Term Definition
Term Definition
Term Definition
Term Definition
Term Definition

Alice is the quantum information sender
Bob is the quantum information receiver
The portion of the QKD system that functions on a classical communication channel and whose function and
security are based on classical proofs.
Controls all cryptographic entities
The portion of the QKD system that functions on a quantum communication channel and whose security and
functions are based on quantum mechanics principles and proofs.
The probability that a single photon detector will register a photon detection event tiggered by a previous photon
detection
The probability that a single photon detector will register a photon when none is present.
The expected percentage of bit errors in a raw quantum key based on probabilistic quantum properties and
physical system limitations. An error rate over a specified threshold indicates a potential problem within the
QKD system.
Uncertainty in detection time for a single photon detector.
The process by which a user such as Alice or Bob confirms their identity.
The process by which Alice and Bob ensure their sifted keys are identical.
Low photon-count weak coherent pulses that are preceded in time by a brighter pulse of light.
The process by which Alice and Bob agree on a cryptographic key.
Information theoretic perfect security. By definition, secure even against an adversary with unlimited computing
power. QKD proofs use quantum physics to achieve this level of security, at least on a mathematical level.

Polarization Basis

Term Definition

Privacy Amplification
Synchronization

Term Definition
Term Definition

A pair of orthogonal polarizations. The three polarization bases are rectilinear (horizontal and vertical), diagonal
(+45 and -45 degrees), and rotational (left- and right-circular). In QKD, each polarization in each basis is
arbitrarily defined as either a 0 or a 1. Of note is that any polarization measured in an incorrect basis has an
equal probability of being measured as either a 0 or a 1.
A method for reducing the amound of information gained by an unauthorized third party during key
The process by which Alice and Bob determine their clock timing.

Step 4, Collect, Organize, Correlate and Store Data is carried out by collecting
and storing data. In the case of this research, data was collected from a background
review of information pertaining to QKD and standards. The data was reviewed for
security requirements, system functions and component configuration. This data was then
organized into the views presented here.
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Step 5 of the architecting process, Conduct Analysis in Support of Objectives,
involves determining the adherence to requirements. It also identifies additional steps
needed to complete the description. By applying the standards criteria synthesized in the
matrix to the architecture developed in this Chapter, the results show that it addresses the
majority of the requirements from a high level perspective. A summary comparison of all
the papers and the architecture discussed here is presented in Figure 3. When this
architecture is developed in lower levels of abstraction, these considerations will be
specified in detail.

Security Standards Matrix Summary with Proposed Architecture
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Figure 4. Standards Consideration Comparison Summary

In addition to the products already developed, results of the comparison indicate
where the top level architecture is not sufficient to meet standards. This allows
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recommendations to be made for additional development. Areas where this proposed
architecture fails to consider standards are primarily in software documentation. For now,
the architecture products discussed in Steps 3 provide a prototype of the hardware
configuration, functions and processes that must be addressed. Step 6 will illustrate the
remaining views in this research.
Step 6, Document Results in Accordance with Decision-Maker Needs presents the
actual architecture for review. The StdV-1 in Table 7 provides the information for
relevant standards documents. The standards enumerated in Table 7 are limited to those
discussed in this thesis.

Table 7. StdV-1
Name
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) QKD Module Security
Specification
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Security Proofs
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Components and Internal
Interfaces
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Application Interface
Quantum Key Distribution; Use Cases
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication, Security
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules
Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part

Author

Date Version

European Telecommuncations Standards Institute
European Telecommuncations Standards Institute

2010 V1.1.1
2010 V1.1.1

European Telecommuncations Standards Institute
European Telecommuncations Standards Institute
European Telecommuncations Standards Institute

2010 V1.1.1
2010 V1.1.1
2010 V1.1.1

National Institute of Standards and Technology

2001 140-2

United States Department of Defense

1985

Australia The Defence Signals Directorate
New Zealand Government Communications Security
Bureau
Canada Communications Security Establishment
France Direction Centrale de la Sécurité des
Systèmes d'Information
Germany Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
Japan Information Technology Promotion Agency
Netherlands National Communications Security
Agency

2009

Spain Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas and
Centro Criptológico Nacional
United Kingdom Communications-Electronics
Security Group
United States National Security Agency
United States National Institute of Standards and
Technology
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3.1

The OV-1 concept graphic is shown below in Figure 4. It demonstrates the
simplest top level concept view of a QKD system. A QKD system is designed to share a
secret between at least two people. It consists of two or more nodes. Each node contains a
quantum module and a classical module that communicate with the necessary
components.

Hey Bob, I have a secret…

Alice

Bob

Quantum Module

Classical Module

Quantum
Channel

Classical
Channel

Quantum Module

Classical Module

Figure 5. OV-1

The concept graphic must be developed further into other views. The next view
developed here is a block definition diagram. The block definition diagram is explicitly
required by the ETSI standards and provides an opportunity to examine the critical
components and interfaces in a QKD system by delving another level into the quantum
and classical modules. The block diagram allows an architect to begin to provide a
module specification.
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The classical module contains the components that perform classical
communications functions as well as interface with the classical or public channel. The
quantum module contains the apparatus unique to quantum key distribution and the
quantum modules send data across a quantum channel. Additionally, the classical and
quantum modules must interface with each other. Within a quantum module the photon
pulses are generated, attenuated, encoded and detected. In this illustration, we assume
that Alice is the secret sender and will generate and encode the photons and Bob is the
secret receiver and will receive and decode the photons. It is important to note that Alice
as the secret sender does not always generate the signal for all possible implementations,
but for simplicity and the need to discuss component architecture, we assume it to be the
case here. Additionally, the quantum channel can be considered a trusted channel. The
full implications of this should be explored in a more detailed architecture.
The block diagram in Figure 5 depicts Alice and Bob containing a quantum and
classical module. The critical classical components depicted are a clock, power supply,
key storage, buffers and memory. The quantum apparatus or quantum module contains an
element of randomness, a way of altering the quantum signal, and a component(s) that
either generate a quantum signal, such as a laser, or detect a quantum signal, such as an
Avalanche Photo-Diode (APD). At this level of abstraction the architecture begins to
utilize non ideal components. The laser that generates a quantum signal does not generate
single photons required by security protocols and the APD is not a perfect single photon
detector. If an architect were to define another layer in each component, these non-ideal
components could begin to be analyzed from an architectural perspective.
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The classical and quantum modules will need to interface. The interface will
eventually need to define the physical and logical interconnections, but that detail is left
for developers. Additionally, the interface will need to consider the possibility of
different levels of security requirements as the quantum channel is generally considered
secure and the classical channel is public. Finally, at this level, Alice and Bob will need a
way for information to flow on a classical and quantum channel. As physical and logical
definition gets more detailed, configuration management will also become important.
Also specified in the ETSI standards is a Finite State Model. In this research, the
Finite State Model is represented using an SV-10 State Transition Diagram. The main
states of a QKD system as well as their event triggers are shown in Figure 6. In a lower
level architecture this would be developed sufficiently to prove that the module complies
with all standards requirements. Details on the security implications of each state and
transition will be provided. Security standards require the following states to be included:
Power on/off, Initialization, Crypto Officer, CSP Entry, Approved, Self-test and Error.
The model below also includes a Calibration, Synchronization and Authentication.
Theses states were displayed separately due to their security function criticality. Only a
single error state is shown, however as event triggers and other events are provided in
greater detail, the error state will need to be better specified. Additionally, it should be
noted that “Approved Operations” encompasses the actual QKD key-exchange process.
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Figure 7. State Transition Diagram

UML Use Cases must also be developed to describe the critical functions a QKD
system must perform. The use cases below describe these main functions. Use cases are
developed in a casual format.
Use-Case: Start System
Brief Description
To successfully start a QKD system, the components must be powered on and
pass a series of start-up self tests. The start-up tests should be designed to determine if all
components are present and operating within acceptable parameters, are functioning
without compromise and they must not radiate information beyond the cryptographic
boundary (i.e. the data output must be disabled). The system should operate in initial start
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up mode at minimum long enough to eliminate correlation between initial state and
operational state.
Preconditions
The QKD system is securely delivered and installed.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Use-Case: Perform Self Test
Brief Description
Self-tests ensure all components of the module are present and functioning
correctly and in a secure state. A QKD module performs self-test for three specific
purposes: pre-operational checks for software integrity, cryptographic algorithm
implementation, and bypass capability logic; conditional checks for conditions specifying
pair-wise consistency tests, software load tests, manual key entry tests, continuous RBG
tests, RBG entropy source tests and conditional bypass tests; and other critical functions
specified for secure operation. Pre-operational tests must be performed after the system is
powered up, woken from hibernation state, or switched from one mode of operation to
another, but prior to authentication or any other security function. Conditional and critical
function self-tests are performed when conditions are met for specified tests or critical
security functions, periodically, or when specified by a user. Tests to verify the mitigation
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of one or more specific known QKD attacks will also be conducted to validate security
mechanisms.
Alternative Flows
Error State
In the event a self-test fails, system will enter an error state. Error states must be
specified along with any response or operating capability restrictions. Response to error
state should include a need for trusted recovery when results show module to be insecure.
Degraded Capability
In the event of self-test failure, system may be operated within a specified
approved mode of operation supporting degraded capability.
Maintenance Mode
If self-test results indicate a problem, system may enter maintenance mode until
resolved.
Special Requirements
Data Output Interface
All data (except status data output via the status output interface) that is output
from a cryptographic module (including plaintext data, ciphertext data, cryptographic
keys, authentication data, and control information for another module) shall exit via the
"data output" interface. All data output via the data output interface shall be inhibited
when an error state exists and during self-tests
Specification Requirements
Conditions, critical security functions and testing method should be specified.
Pre-operational Tests
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Pre-operational Tests should be automatic.
Use-Case: Calibrate
Brief Description
Before beginning operations, a QKD system must be calibrated within
specification. Additionally, periodic re-calibration will be needed for continuous
operations. To account for the photon number splitting attack when utilizing an
attenuated optical pulse, the intensity, photon number statistics and source stability will
be calibrated. The optical source will be calibrated at high power and then attenuated
down to single-photon level. The detector will be calibrated utilizing source intensity
determined by measuring the un-attenuated laser.
Preconditions
List all assumptions. Consider that a QKD system includes an optical, electronics,
and classical layer. Any assumption made may impact the overall security of the system.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Use-Case: Authenticate
Brief Description
QKD requires a secure authentication function and protocol that will be used to
authenticate the sender, receiver, message text and time-stamp to ensure that the message
originated and was sent where intended and was not modified during transmission. QKD
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requires two-factor identity based authentication. The recommended secure function is a
two-universal hash function. The protocol for the authentication function should ideally
be submitted as a security proof. Authentication is done on the public channel and initial
authentication may be handled using a pre-distributed secret. Subsequent authentication
will use a fraction of the generated key to perform authentication.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Special Requirements
Authentication Strength
The strength of the authentication mechanism will meet the following:
•

For each attempt to use the authentication mechanism, the probability
shall be equal to or less than one in 134 217 728 that a false acceptance
will occur

•

For multiple attempts to use the authentication mechanism during a oneminute period, the probability shall be equal to or less than one in 4 294
967 296 that a false acceptance will occur.

•

Time between consecutive attempts will be no less than 2 seconds.

•

Authentication shall be met by implementation and not rely on
documented procedural controls or security rules (e.g. password size
restrictions).
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•

If passwords are utilized, then restrictions shall be enforced by the module
on password selection.

•

Feedback of authentication data to an operator shall be obscured during
authentication (e.g. no visible display of characters when entering a
password).

•

Feedback provided during authentication shall not weaken the strength of
the authentication beyond that required.

•

For first-time authentication, the default authentication data shall be
unique to each module.

Object Reuse
Each session must be authenticated and no information not pertaining to that
session may be available to users.
User Data Protection
Authentication mechanisms must be in place that protects user data during the
authentication process, information flow and export.
Use-Case: Synchronize
Brief Description
Alice and Bob must synchronize their respective clocks prior to beginning
operations to provide correct, secure operation of the QKD system. Re-synchronization
must occur at pre-defined conditions to account for frequency drift and jitter. One method
of synchronization is to use signal and decoy pulses that are attenuated to a single photon.
After attenuated pulses are created they are wavelength division multiplexed with a much
stronger clock pulse to synchronize Alice and Bob’s electronics.
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Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Special Requirements
Frequency Drift
Frequency drift will be less than 10-8 parts per clock cycle.
Jitter
Jitter will be 10-2 % of a detector gate length.
Use-Case: Generate Quantum Signal
Brief Description
Generate quantum signal describes the process for generating and encoding a
photon with a bit of information. In practical QKD system, this is done using an
attenuated optical pulse. For example, Alice generates a weak coherent pulse and
attenuates to a single photon level. Alice randomly chooses a base value for coding and
uses a phase modulator to set the base. Alice then stores the base and value for later use.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Use-Case: Transmit Quantum Signal
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Brief Description
The attenuated laser pulse is transmitted over a quantum channel (i.e. fiber or free
space) to Bob.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Use-Case: Detect Quantum Signal
Brief Description
Bob’s single photon detectors enter ready state. Bob will randomly select a base
value and use a phase modulator to set the base. Bob will then set open the set detection
gate to receive a photon. Once Bob has recorded detection, he will store the base and
value and the detectors will ender a dead period where they detect no photons.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
No Detection
Because single photon detectors are probabilistic, there may be no detection event
even if a photon is present. In this case the detectors will remain in ready state.
False Positive
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Single photon detectors may yield false positives (ex: dark counts). In this case,
detectors will ender a dead time and then move back to a ready state.
Use-Case: Final Key Distillation
Brief Description
Once an agreed upon number of photons have been sent and received, Alice and
Bob communicate over the public channel the base used to send and measure each
photon. If the bases match, the bits are kept, if they differ, the bits are discarded. If the
error rate is below a specified threshold, the key is considered secure.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Error Threshold
If the bit error rate is above a certain threshold, the key is discarded as unsecure
and cause must be determined.
Use-Case: Error Correction
Brief Description
After an agreed number of photons sent that guarantee a minimum predefined
length, Alice and Bob have blocks of bits specifying index, base and bit value are stored.
An error reconciliation protocol such as CASCADE or LDPC is implemented over the
public channel to ensure both keys are identical.
Preconditions
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After key distillation, the error rate must be below the specified threshold to begin
error correction.
Use-Case: Privacy Amplification
Brief Description
An approved privacy amplification procedure may be used on the results of the
reconciled blocks. Privacy amplification reduces public knowledge about the final key by
producing a new, shorter key via a specified function.
Preconditions
After key distillation, the error rate must be below the specified threshold to begin
error correction.
Use-Case: Monitor Performance
Brief Description
Performance statistics will be collected and periodically review to ensure system
is operating in an approved and expected state. Additionally, performance monitoring
should indicate if resources are being appropriately utilized and to perform covert
channel analysis. Parameters monitored should be specified.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the statistics collected indicate unapproved operation, system
failure or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Use-Case: React to Failure
Brief Description
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If at any time the system fails or begins to operate outside of approved modes or
parameters, steps must be taken to ensure no loss of secret information. As such, a
method and conditions for stopping and re-starting operations at any point must be
specified that meet requirements for trusted recovery.
Use-Case: Audit
Brief Description
The system must have a mechanism to record modification, access, deletion, and addition
of data. This information must be recorded and stored via approved mechanisms to
prevent unauthorized disclosure, modification or deletion of audit information. Audit
information must be available upon request by authorized persons. In the event an audit
detects a potential security event, steps to be taken should be specified.
Use-Case: Cryptographic Key Management
Brief Description
The QKD protocol accounts for random number generation, key generation and
key establishment. The Cryptographic Key Management use case must describe the Key
Entry and Output, Key Storage, and Key Zeroization methods.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Use-Case: Manage Security
Brief Description
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A process must be established for managing security attributes, data and
functions. It should specify access control and capability. Additionally, management
roles and interaction must be defined.
Alternative Flows
Error State
If at any point in the main use case, events do not go as anticipated, system failure
or error states must be specified along with any response or operating capability
restrictions.
Finally, within the documentation for a QKD system, there must be some fit for
purpose view that details the policies the developer plans to ensure trusted distribution
and physical security. This can be as simple as a policy document describing the methods
or more complex if the user or developer requires. This view is acknowledged here, but
the specific format is left up to the developer and user.
Use-Case: Entropy Loss Estimation
Brief Description
This is the process where all information regarding the QKD system (QBER,
calibration data, information leaked during error correction, etc.) is utilized to determine
how much privacy amplification must be done in order to ensure a secure key is
generated.
The above architectural products provide key views and critical information to
consider when developing a QKD system. They are formatted to provide easily analyze
how well the prototypical system meets standards, but not to provide any meaningful
analysis on system performance or quantify security.
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4.5 Summary
This chapter demonstrates the extent to which industry technical standards,
specifically the Common Criteria, FIPS 140-2, DoD Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria and the ETSI QKD standards are utilized in published QKD research.
Additionally, it presents a prototypical architecture for consideration in future
development and discusses the extent to which it meets the standards presented.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter will answer the investigative questions and discuss shortfalls and
areas for future research.

5.2 Investigative Questions Answered
Published QKD systems address partial security standards requirements
peripherally, and do not directly consider them when discussing system implementation
and security concerns. No papers surveyed displayed a definitive discussion of
parameters found in the industry standards surveyed. The four standards that are selected
in this research to apply to QKD are the Common Criteria, FIPS 140-2, DoD Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria and the ETSI QKD standards. These are the
minimum that should be considered for high level discussions. When developing more
detailed architecture, additional standards will need to be considered.
By conducting a review of security requirements found in the above mentioned
documents, the six step systems architecture process and DoDAFv2.0 guidelines provide
prototypical system documentation for further research and development. The views
developed in this thesis should be considered the minimum architectural models for
security considerations not a complete meta-model for analysis. The Use Cases and State
Transition Diagram provide a reference for main system functions and states. The critical
components are documented in a block diagram and by delving additional layers into this
view the specific hardware components used in any particular implementation can be
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identified. It can then be determined how they differ from hardware presented in security
proofs. At the level developed for this thesis, we see that the single photon detector is in
fact an avalanche photo-diode which functions probabilistically based on several
parameters. We also see the laser which is incapable of generating the single photon
required by security proofs. These are two major components defined differently from the
security proofs. The common parameters to consider are identified in the Use Cases.

5.3 Research Limitations
By utilizing this process, a top level architecture prototype was developed that
met 84% of the standards considered. The 16% not met can be attributed to the several
shortfalls. A large portion of the standards not met were software concerns. This thesis
focused primarily on hardware and processes; however, in an actual system
implementation software integrity and functionality will be important and logical
interfaces must be defined.
From a content analysis perspective, the scope of this thesis is incredibly
restrictive. Only analyzing 10 research papers against four standards is a relatively small
sampling of content to review. A larger sampling would hold more meaning, but would
be difficult to accomplish within the constraints of this thesis.
Architecturally, no actual or simulated QKD system was analyzed to determine
accuracy of architecture. The architecture was left vague for scoping purposes, but means
that simulation or testing is impossible. Additionally, because QKD limitations and
vulnerabilities stem from real world implementation, not having test documentation from
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a physical system in its actual operational environment severely limits the effectiveness
of an architectural analysis.

5.4 Recommendations for Future Research
I recommend the limitations within the standards presented by this research be
addressed further. The four standards analyzed above do apply and should be used when
building a QKD system they are not a perfect fit. There are strengths and weaknesses
within each criteria chosen.
The intent of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria definitely applies
to QKD. However, as this document has been superseded by more updated standards
such as the Common Criteria, this should only be used for academic consideration of
older systems.
The Common Criteria are designed to be flexible and allow a range of security
concerns to be looked at. They provide a methodology for evaluating the security of a
system. As such, they are useful when developing and examining QKD. If used, their
flexibility should be utilized and they should be tailored where applicable. The tailoring
of the Common Criteria will need to consider the specific implementation of QKD being
evaluated as various implementations of QKD differ in greatly in system setup and
needed security level. The Common Criteria, however, do not address the unique
physical components or probabilistic security nature of QKD.
FIPS 140-2 as a federal cryptographic standard is very applicable to QKD, but
will need to be tailored based on the implementation and use of the specific QKD system
being evaluated. For example, guidance applying to use of public keys may not be
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relevant to QKD and therefore not need to be considered. It provides a suite of tests with
four security levels in regards to physical security, key management, roles and services,
etc. FIPS 140-2, like the Common Criteria, does not address the unique nature of QKD
security.
As the ETSI standards were created specifically for QKD modules, they are the
most relevant. They address known parameters of the system and major components as
well as discuss QKD specific protocols for key generation. However, they are not
sufficient to evaluate the security of a system. For example, a stated goal within the QKD
Security Proofs standard is to, “clarify which parameters need to be monitored
continuously or periodically to assure the generation of a secret key for the different
security levels [4].” The document provides needed discussion of parameters that affect
security, but does not quantify the security level or address how it should be validated.
Needed security can vary greatly based on system purpose, but thresholds are not given
within the QKD Security Proofs document to quantify the various levels.
Additionally, processes for dealing with multiple security levels within a QKD
module should be defined. For example, the interface between the quantum and classical
modules in a QKD system must be carefully reviewed. Due to the nature of the system, a
quantum module operates at a higher security level than a classical module. Exactly how
the security levels differ and what restrictions should apply as they are forced to interact
needs to be addressed in detail. The standards reviewed do not address this particular
concern that becomes apparent as the system is developed in more detail.
A formal methodology is needed to quantify the security of real-world QKD
systems and components and provide for independent testing and validation. Standards
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could be developed that rigorously define the security within components, protocols and
software used in QKD. For example, the laser that generates a single photon, the detector
designed to detect a single photon, the configuration of the quantum channel are three
main physical areas that are key to QKD security. The ETSI standards provide guidance
as to how these should be implemented, but for independent validation, calibration,
testing and other concerns, there may be additional standards that should be met.
Developing a measurement framework and explicitly defining component and system
parameters is a step that has begun to be taken, but must be developed further. There is an
ongoing effort that began in September 2011 designed to provide a measurement
framework. Metrology for Industrial Quantum Communications is attempting to define
the operating parameters for photon emitters, quantum channels and photon receivers
used in QKD [32]. This provides a start to developing independent verification and
definition of security.
I also recommend that future research utilize all existing applicable security
standards for both cryptographic modules and trusted systems. This research is limited to
four; however, there is a much larger body of knowledge that should be addressed in any
practical attempt to develop QKD. These standards will need to be reviewed and tailored
for the operation and configuration selected by each implementation. Some standards to
consider are: NIST 800 series, ISO 27000 series, FIPS Publication 199 Standards for
Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems, and other
protocol specific standards published by the National Institutes for Standards and
Technology.
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The final recommendation derived from this research is to further develop a
coherent integrated QKD architecture. A coherent and integrated architecture would
utilize the industry security standards considered in this research as well as those omitted
due to scoping limitations and help identify areas where standards fall short or need to be
tailored for unique QKD concerns. Its formal process would generate a discussion of the
future research concerns above and assist in testing and analysis of the many varied QKD
configurations.

5.5 Summary
This chapter provides a summary of research conducted in this thesis. It concludes
that IT industry standards are not considered in QKD research publications. It enumerates
the limitations found in this research and it provides discussion for future research, both
for industry standards and for architectural development.
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

BB84 – Bennett and Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution protocol. A quantum
key distribution protocol using single, polarized photons to encode information.
DoDAF v2.0 – Department of Defense Architecture Framework v2.0. The
overarching framework and conceptual model enabling development of architectures for
Department of Defense decision makers.
ETSI – European Telecommunications Standards Institute. International body
that seeks to produce globally applicable standards for Information and Communications
Technology.
IT – Information Technology
CC – Common Criteria. Part of an international technical basis by which
Information Technology products can be evaluated by independent laboratories to
determine fulfillment of security properties.
CEM – Common Methodology for Information Technology System Evaluation.
Part of an international technical basis by which Information Technology products can be
evaluated by independent laboratories to determine fulfillment of security properties.
FIPS – Federal Information Processing Standards. United States standards issued
by the National Institute for Standards and Technology and approved by the Secretary of
Commerce.
AV – DoDAF v2.0 All Viewpoint. This viewpoint contains two models that
describe the overarching aspects of the architectural context.
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OV - DoDAF v2.0 Operational Viewpoint. This viewpoint contains nine models
that describes operational scenarios and activities requirements.
SV - DoDAF v2.0 Systems Viewpoint. This viewpoint contains 13 models that
describe the design for solutions by articulating their systems, interconnectivity, and
context.
StdV - DoDAF v2.0 Standards Viewpoint. This viewpoint contains two models
that articulate the present and projected policies, standards and guidance.
QBER – Quantum Bit Error Rate. The ratio of an error rate to the key rate.
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Appendix B: Example In Depth Standards Requirements
The standards presented in this thesis were largely abridged due to constraints
caused by the need to scope this effort. Below is an example of what a more in depth look
would require for the DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria. Of note are the
differing levels of security evaluation requirements based on the security concerns of the
system. An in depth look would require classifying each major module of the QKD
system and addressing them based on the security required within each subsystem. This
greatly increases the complexity of the interactions, interfaces, and related analysis
required.
Discretionary Access Control (C1): The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) shall define
and control access between named users and named objects (e.g., files and
programs) in the ADP system. The enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public
controls, access control lists) shall allow users to specify and control sharing of those
objects by named individuals or defined groups or both.

Identification and Authentication (C1): The TCB shall require users to identify
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is
expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall use a protected mechanism (e.g.,
passwords) to authenticate the user's identity.The TCB shall protect authentication
data so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user.

System Architecture (C1): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution
protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its code or
data structures). Resources controlled by the TCB may be a defined subset of the
subjects and objects in the ADP system.

System Integrity (C1): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and
firmware elements of the TCB.
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Security Testing (C1): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. Testing shall be done to
assure that there are no obvious ways for an unauthorized user to bypass or
otherwise defeat the security protection mechanisms of the TCB. (See the Security
Testing Guidelines.)
Security Features User's Guide (C1): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
Trusted Facility Manual (C1): A manual addressed to the ADP System Administrator
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when
running a secure facility.
Test Documentation (C1): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the the
security mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms' functional
testing.
Design Documentation (C1): Documentation shall be available that provides a
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how
this philosophy is translated into the TCB. If the TCB is composed of distinct
modules, the interfaces between these modules shall be described.

Discretionary Access Control (C2): The TCB shall define and control access
between named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP
system. The enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public controls, access
control lists) shall allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects by
named individuals, or defined groups of individuals, or by both, and shall provide
controls to limit propagation of access rights. The discretionary access control
mechanism shall, either by explicit user action or by default, provide that objects are
protected from unauthorized access. These access controls shall be capable of
including or excluding access to the granularity of a single user. Access permission
to an object by users not already possessing access permission shall only be
assigned by authorized users.

Object Reuse (C2): All authorizations to the information contained within a storage
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation to a
subject from the TCB's pool of unused storage objects. No information, including
encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior subject's actions is to
be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released
back to the system.

78

Identification and Authentication (C2): The TCB shall require users to identify
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is
expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall use a protected mechanism (e.g.,
passwords) to authenticate the user's identity. The TCB shall protect authentication
data so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user. The TCB shall be able
to enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify
each individual ADP system user. The TCB shall also provide the capability of
associating this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual.

Audit (C2): The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification
or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it
protects. The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is
limited to those who are authorized for audit data. The TCB shall be able to record
the following types of events: use of identification and authentication mechanisms,
introduction or objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program
initiation), deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer operators and system
administrators and/or system security officers, and other security relevant events.
For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and time of the event,
user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. For
identification/authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be
included in the audit record. For events that introduce an object into a user's
address space and for object deletion events the audit record shall include the name
of the object. The ADP system administrator shall be able to selectively audit the
actions of any one or more users based on individual identity.
System Architecture (C2): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution
that protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its
code or data structures). Resources controlled by the TCB may be a defined subset
of the subjects and objects in the ADP system. The TCB shall isolate the resources
to be protected so that they are subject to the access control and auditing
requirements.

System Integrity (C2): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and
firmware elements of the TCB.
Security Testing (C2): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. Testing shall be done to
assure that there are no obvious ways for an unauthorized user to bypass or
otherwise defeat the security protection mechanisms of the TCB. Testing shall also
include a search for obvious flaws that would allow violation of resource isolation, or
that would permit unauthorized access to the audit or authentication data. (See the
Security Testing guidelines.)

Security Features User's Guide (C2): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
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Trusted Facility Manual (C2): A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when
running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall
be given.

Test Documentation (C2): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms’ functional testing.

Design Documentation (C2): Documentation shall be available that provides a
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how
this philosophy is translated into the TCB. If the TCB is composed of distinct
modules, the interfaces between these modules shall be described.

Discretionary Access Control (B1): The TCB shall define and control access between
named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP system. The
enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public controls, access control lists) shall
allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects by named individuals, or
defined groups of individuals, or by both, and shall provide controls to limit
propagation of access rights. The discretionary access control mechanism shall,
either by explicit user action or by default, provide that objects are protected from
unauthorized access. These access controls shall be capable of including or
excluding access to the granularity of a single user. Access permission to an object
by users not already possessing access permission shall only be assigned by
authorized users.

Object Reuse (B1): All authorizations to the information contained within a storage
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation to a
subject from the TCB's pool of unused storage objects. No information, including
encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior subject's actions is to
be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released
back to the system.
Labels (B1): Sensitivity labels associated with each subject and storage object under
its control (e.g., process, file, segment, and device) shall be maintained by the TCB.
These labels shall be used as the basis for mandatory access control decisions. In
order to import non-labeled data, the TCB shall request and receive from an
authorized user the security level of the data, and all such actions shall be auditable
by the TCB.
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Label Integrity (B1): Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security levels of the
specific subjects or objects with which they are associated. When exported by the
TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal
labels and shall be associated with the information being exported.

Exportation of Labeled Information (B1): The TCB shall designate each
communication channel and I/O device as either single-level or multi level. Any
change in this designation shall be done manually and shall be auditable by the
TCB. The TCB shall maintain and be able to audit any change in the security level
or levels associated with a communication channel or I/O device.

Exportation to Multilevel Devices (B1): When the TCB exports an object to a
multilevel I/O device, the sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be
exported and shall reside on the same physical medium as the exported information
and shall be in the same form (i.e., machine-readable or human-readable form).
When the TCB exports or imports an object over a multilevel communication
channel, the protocol used on that channel shall provide for the unambiguous pairing
between the sensitivity labels and the associated information that is sent or received.

Exportation to Single-Level Devices (B1): Single-level I/O devices and single-level
communication channels are not required to maintain the sensitivity labels of the
information they process. However, the TCB shall include a mechanism by which
the TCb and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the single
security level of information imported or exported via single-level communication
channels or I/O devices.
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Mandatory Access Control (B1): The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control
policy over all subjects and storage objects under its control (e.g., processes, files,
segments, devices). These subjects and objects shall be assigned sensitivity labels
that are a combination of hierarchical classification levels and non-hierarchical
categories, and the labels shall be used as the basis for mandatory access control
decisions. The TCB shall be able to support two or more such security levels. (See
the Mandatory Access Control Guidelines.) The following requirements shall hold for
all accesses between subjects and objects controlled by the TCB: a subject can
read an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security level is
greater than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's security level
and the non- hierarchical categories in the subject's security level include all the nonhierarchical categories in the object's security level. A subject can write an object
only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security level is less than or
equal to the hierarchical classification in the object’s security level and all the nonhierarchical categories in the subject's security level are included in the nonhierarchical categories in the object's security level. Identification and authentication
data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and to ensure that
the security level and authorization of subjects external to the TCB that may be
created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the clearance and
authorization of that user.
Identification and Authentication (B1): The TCB shall require users to identify
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is
expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall maintain authentication data that
includes information for verifying the identity of individual users (e.g., passwords) as
well as information for determining the clearance and authorizations or individual
users. This data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and to
ensure that the security level and authorizations of subjects external to the TCB that
may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the
clearance and authorization of that user. The TCB shall protect authentication data
so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user. The TCB shall be able to
enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify each
individual ADP system user. The TCB shall also provide the capability of associating
this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual.

Audit (B1): The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification
or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it
protects. The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is
limited to those who are authorized for audit data. The TCB shall be able to record
the following types of events: use of identification and authentication mechanisms,
introduction of objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation),
deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer operators and system
administrators and/or system security officers and other security relevant events.
The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-readable output
markings. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and time of
the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. For
identification/authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be
included in the audit record. For events that introduce an object into a user’s
address space and for object deletion events the audit record shall include the name
of the object and the object's security level. The ADP system administrator shall be
able to selectively audit the actions of any one or more users based on individual
identity and/or object security level.
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System Architecture (B1): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution
that protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its
code or data structures). Resources controlled by the TCB may be a defined subset
of the subjects and objects in the ADP system. The TCB shall maintain process
isolation through the provision of distinct address spaces under its control. The TCB
shall isolate the resources to be protected so that they are subject to the access
control and auditing requirements.

System Integrity (B1): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and
firmware elements of the TCB.
Security Testing (B1): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. A team of individuals
who thoroughly understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its
design documentation, source code, and object code to thorough analysis and
testing. Their objectives shall be: to uncover all design and implementation flaws
that would permit a subject external to the TCB to read, change, or delete data
normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary security policy enforced by the
TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without authorization to do so) is able to
cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to respond to communications
initiated by other users. All discovered flaws shall be removed or neutralized and
the TCB retested to demonstrate that they have been eliminated and that new flaws
have not been introduced. (See the Security Testing Guidelines.)

Design Specification and Verification (B1): An informal or formal model of the
security policy supported by the TCB shall be maintained over the life cycle of the
ADP system and demonstrated to be consistent with its axioms.

Security Features User's Guide (B1): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
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Trusted Facility Manual (B1): A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when
running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall
be given. The manual shall describe the operator and administrator functions related
to security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user. It shall provide
guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features of the
system, how they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility
procedures, warnings, and privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate
the facility in a secure manner.

Test Documentation (B1): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms’ functional testing.

Design Documentation (B1): Documentation shall be available that provides a
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how
this philosophy is translated into the TCB. If the TCB is composed of distinct
modules, the interfaces between these modules shall be described. An informal or
formal description of the security policy model enforced by the TCB shall be
available and an explanation provided to show that it is sufficient to enforce the
security policy. The specific TCB protection mechanisms shall be identified and an
explanation given to show that they satisfy the model.

Discretionary Access Control (B2): The TCB shall define and control access between
named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP system. The
enforcement mechanism (e.g., self/group/public controls, access control lists) shall
allow users to specify and control sharing of those objects by named individuals, or
defined groups of individuals, or by both, and shall provide controls to limit
propagation of access rights. The discretionary access control mechanism shall,
either by explicit user action or by default, provide that objects are protected from
unauthorized access. These access controls shall be capable of including or
excluding access to the granularity of a single user. Access permission to an object
by users not already possessing access permission shall only be assigned by
authorized users.
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Object Reuse (B2): All authorizations to the information contained within a storage
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation to a
subject from the TCB's pool of unused storage objects. No information, including
encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior subject’s actions is to
be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released
back to the system.
Labels (B2): Sensitivity labels associated with each ADP system resource (e.g.,
subject, storage object, ROM) that is directly or indirectly accessible by subjects
external to the TCB shall be maintained by the TCB. These labels shall be used as
the basis for mandatory access control decisions. In order to import non-labeled
data, the TCB shall request and receive from an authorized user the security level of
the data, and all such actions shall be auditable by the TCB.

Label Integrity (B2): Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security levels of the
specific subjects or objects with which they are associated. When exported by the
TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal
labels and shall be associated with the information being exported.

Exportation of Labeled Information (B2): The TCB shall designate each
communication channel and I/O device as either single-level or multilevel. Any
change in this designation shall be done manually and shall be auditable by the
TCB. The TCB shall maintain and be able to audit any change in the security level
or levels associated with a communication channel or I/O device.

Exportation to Multilevel Devices (B1): When the TCB exports an object to a
multilevel I/O device, the sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be
exported and shall reside on the same physical medium as the exported information
and shall be in the same form (i.e., machine-readable or human-readable form).
When the TCB exports or imports an object over a multilevel communication
channel, the protocol used on that channel shall provide for the unambiguous pairing
between the sensitivity labels and the associated information that is sent or received.
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Exportation to Single-Level Devices (B1): Single-level I/O devices and single-level
communication channels are not required to maintain the sensitivity labels of the
information they process. However, the TCB shall include a mechanism by which
the TCb and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the single
security level of information imported or exported via single-level communication
channels or I/O devices.

Subject Sensitivity Labels (B2): The TCB shall immediately notify a terminal user of
each change in the security level associated with that user during an interactive
session. A terminal user shall be able to query the TCB as desired for a display of
the subject's complete sensitivity label.

Device Labels (B2): The TCB shall support the assignment of minimum and
maximum security levels to all attached physical devices. These security levels shall
be used by the TCB to enforce constraints imposed by the physical environments in
which the devices are located.
Mandatory Access Control (B2): The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control
policy over all resources (i.e., subjects, storage objects, and I/O devices that are
directly or indirectly accessible by subjects external to the TCB. These subjects and
objects shall be assigned sensitivity labels that are a combination of hierarchical
classification levels and non-hierarchical categories, and the labels shall be used as
the basis for mandatory access control decisions. The TCB shall be able to support
two or more such security levels. (See the Mandatory Access Control guidelines.)
The following requirements shall hold for all accesses between All subjects external
to the TCB and all objects directly or indirectly accessible by these subjects: A
subject can read an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's
security level is greater than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's
security level and the non- hierarchical categories in the subject's security level
include all the non-hierarchical categories in the object's security level. A subject
can write an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security level
is less than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's security level and
all the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level are included in the
non-hierarchical categories in the object's security level. Identification and
authentication data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and
to ensure that the security level and authorization of subjects external to the TCB
that may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the
clearance and authorization of that user.
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Identification and Authentication (B2): The TCB shall require users to identify
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is
expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall maintain authentication data that
includes information for verifying the identity of individual users (e.g., passwords) as
well as information for determining the clearance and authorizations of individual
users. This data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and to
ensure that the security level and authorizations of subjects external to the TCB that
may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the
clearance and authorization of that user. The TCB shall protect authentication data
so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user. The TCB shall be able to
enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify each
individual ADP system user. The TCB shall also provide the capability of associating
this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual.

Trusted Path (B2): The TCB shall support a trusted communication path between
itself and user for initial login and authentication. Communications via this path shall
be initiated exclusively by a user.
Audit (B2): The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification
or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it
protects. The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is
limited to those who are authorized for audit data. The TCB shall be able to record
the following types of events: use of identification and authentication mechanisms,
introduction of objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program initiation),
deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer operators and system
administrators and/or system security officers, and other security relevant events.
The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-readable output
markings. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and time of
the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. For identification/
authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be included in the
audit record. For events that introduce an object into a user's address space and for
object deletion events the audit record shall include the name of the object and the
object's security level. The ADP system administrator shall be able to selectively
audit the actions of any one or more users based on individual identity and/or object
security level. The TCB shall be able to audit the identified events that may be used
in the exploitation of covert storage channels.
System Architecture (B2): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution
that protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its
code or data structures). The TCB shall maintain process isolation through the
provision of distinct address spaces under its control. The TCB shall be internally
structured into well-defined largely independent modules. It shall make effective use
of available hardware to separate those elements that are protection-critical from
those that are not. The TCB modules shall be designed such that the principle of
least privilege is enforced. Features in hardware, such as segmentation, shall be
used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (namely:
readable, writeable). The user interface to the TCB shall be completely defined and
all elements of the TCB identified.
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System Integrity (B2): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and
firmware elements of the TCB.
Covert Channel Analysis (B2): The system developer shall conduct a thorough
search for covert storage channels and make a determination (either by actual
measurement or by engineering estimation) of the maximum bandwidth of each
identified channel. (See the covert channels guideline section.)

Trusted Facility Management (B2): The TCB shall support separate operator and
administrator functions.
Security Testing (B2): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. A team of individuals
who thoroughly understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its
design documentation, source code, and object code to thorough analysis and
testing. Their objectives shall be: to uncover all design and implementation flaws
that would permit a subject external to the TCB to read, change, or delete data
normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary security policy enforced by the
TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without authorization to do so) is able to
cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to respond to communications
initiated by other users. The TCB shall be found relatively resistant to penetration.
All discovered flaws shall be corrected and the TCB retested to demonstrate that
they have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been introduced. Testing
shall demonstrate that the TCB implementation is consistent with the descriptive toplevel specification. (See the Security Testing Guidelines.)
Design Specification and Verification (B2): A formal model of the security policy
supported by the TCB shall be maintained over the life cycle of the ADP system that
is proven consistent with its axioms. A descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) of
the TCB shall be maintained that completely and accurately describes the TCB in
terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects. It shall be shown to be an
accurate description of the TCB interface.
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Configuration Management (B2): During development and maintenance of the TCB,
a configuration management system shall be in place that maintains control of
changes to the descriptive top-level specification, other design data, implementation
documentation, and source code, the running version of the object code, and test
fixtures and documentation. The configuration management system shall assure a
consistent mapping among all documentation and code associated with the current
version of the TCB. Tools shall be provided for generation of a new version of the
TCB from source code. Also available shall be tools for comparing a newly
generated version with the previous TCB version in order to ascertain that only the
intended changes have been made in the code that will actually be used as the new
version of the TCB.

Security Features User's Guide (B2): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
Trusted Facility Manual (B2): A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when
running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall
be given. The manual shall describe the operator and administrator functions related
to security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user. It shall
provide guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features of
the system, how they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility
procedures, warnings, and privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate
the facility in a secure manner. The TCB modules that contain the reference
validation mechanism shall be identified. The procedures for secure generation of a
new TCB from source after modification of any modules in the TCB shall be
described.

Test Documentation (B2): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms' functional testing.
It shall include results of testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce
covert channel bandwidths.
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Design Documentation (B2): Documentation shall be available that provides a
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how
this philosophy is translated into the TCB. The interfaces between the TCB
modules shall be described. A formal description of the security policy model
enforced by the TCB shall be available and proven that it is sufficient to enforce the
security policy. The specific TCB protection mechanisms shall be identified and an
explanation given to show that they satisfy the model. The descriptive top-level
specification (DTLS) shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB
interface. Documentation shall describe how the TCB implements the reference
monitor concept and give an explanation why it is tamper resistant, cannot be
bypassed, and is correctly implemented. Documentation shall describe how the
TCB is structured to facilitate testing and to enforce least privilege. This
documentation shall also present the results of the covert channel analysis and the
tradeoffs involved in restricting the channels. All auditable events that may be used
in the exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be identified. The
bandwidths of known covert storage channels the use of which is not detectable by
the auditing mechanisms, shall be provided. (See the Covert Channel Guideline
section.)

Discretionary Access Control (B3): The TCB shall define and control access between
named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP system. The
enforcement mechanism (e.g., access control lists) shall allow users to specify and
control sharing of those objects, and shall provide controls to limit propagation of
access rights. The discretionary access control mechanism shall, either by explicit
user action or by default, provide that objects are protected from unauthorized
access. These access controls shall be capable of specifying, for each named
object, a list of named individuals and a list of groups of named individuals with
their respective modes of access to that object. Furthermore, for each such named
object, it shall be possible to specify a list of named individuals and a list of groups
of named individuals for which no access to the object is to be given. Access
permission to an object by users not already possessing access permission shall
only be assigned by authorized users.

Object Reuse (B3): All authorizations to the information contained within a storage
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation to a
subject from the TCB's pool of unused storage objects. No information, including
encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior subjects actions is to
be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released
back to the system.
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Labels (B3): Sensitivity labels associated with each ADP system resource (e.g.,
subject, storage object, ROM) that is directly or indirectly accessible by subjects
external to the TCB shall be maintained by the TCB. These labels shall be used as
the basis for mandatory access control decisions. In order to import non-labeled
data, the TCB shall request and receive from an authorized user the security level of
the data, and all such actions shall be auditable by the TCB.

Label Integrity (B3): Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security levels of the
specific subjects or objects with which they are associated. When exported by the
TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal
labels and shall be associated with the information being exported.

Exportation of Labeled Information (B3): The TCB shall designate each
communication channel and I/O device as either single-level or multilevel. An
change in this designation shall be done manually and shall be auditable by the
TCB. The TCB shall maintain and be able to audit any change in the security level
or levels associated with a communication channel or I/O device.

Exportation to Multilevel Devices (B3): When the TCB exports an object to a
multilevel I/O device, the sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be
exported and shall reside on the same physical medium as the exported
information and shall be in the same form (i.e., machine-readable or humanreadable form). When the TCB exports or imports an object over a multilevel
communication channel, the protocol used on that channel shall provide for the
unambiguous pairing between the sensitivity labels and the associated information
that is sent or received.

Exportation to Single-Level Devices (B3): Single-level I/O devices and single-level
communication channels are not required to maintain the sensitivity labels of the
information they process. However, the TCB shall include a mechanism by which
the TCB and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the single
security level of information imported or exported via single-level communication
channels or I/O devices.
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Subject Sensitivity Labels (B3): The TCB shall immediately notify a terminal user of
each change in the security level associated with that user during an interactive
session. A terminal user shall be able to query the TCB as desired for a display of
the subject's complete sensitivity label.

Device Labels (B3): The TCB shall support the assignment of minimum and
maximum security levels to all attached physical devices. These security levels shall
be used by the TCB to enforce constraints imposed by the physical environments in
which the devices are located.
Mandatory Access Control (B3): The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control
policy over all resources (i.e., subjects, storage objects, and I/O devices) that are
directly or indirectly accessible by subjects external to the TCB. These subjects and
objects shall be assigned sensitivity labels that are a combination of hierarchical
classification levels and non-hierarchical categories, and the labels shall be used as
the basis for mandatory access control decisions. The TCB shall be able to support
two or more such security levels. (See the Mandatory Access Control guidelines.)
The following requirements shall hold for all accesses between all subjects external
to the TCB and all objects directly or indirectly accessible by these subjects: A
subject can read an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's
security level is greater than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's
security level and the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level
include all the non-hierarchical categories in the object's security level. A subject
can write an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security
level is less than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's security
level and all the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level are
included in the non- hierarchical categories in the object's security level.
Identification and authentication data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the
user's identity and to ensure that the security level and authorization of subjects
external to the TCB that may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are
dominated by the clearance and authorization of that user.
Identification and Authentication (B3): The TCB shall require users to identify
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is
expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall maintain authentication data that
includes information for verifying the identity of individual users (e.g., passwords) as
well as information for determining the clearance and authorizations of individual
users. This data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and to
ensure that the security level and authorizations of subjects external to the TCB
that may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the
clearance and authorization of that user. The TCB shall protect authentication data
so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user. The TCB shall be able to
enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify each
individual ADP system user. The TCB shall also provide the capability of associating
this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual.
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Trusted Path (B3): The TCB shall support a trusted communication path between
itself and users for use when a positive TCB-to- user connection is required (e.g.,
login, change subject security level). Communications via this trusted path shall be
activated exclusively by a user of the TCB and shall be logically isolated and
unmistakably distinguishable from other paths.

Audit (B3): The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from
modification or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the
objects it protects. The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read
access to it is limited to those who are authorized for audit data. The TCB shall be
able to record the following types of events: use of identification and authentication
mechanisms, introduction of objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open,
program initiation), deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer operators and
system administrators and/or system security officers and other security relevant
events. The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-readable output
markings. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and time of
the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. For
identification/authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be
included in the audit record. For events that introduce an object into a user's
address space and for object deletion events the audit record shall include the name
of the object and the object's security level. The ADP system administrator shall be
able to selectively audit the actions of any one or more users based on individual
identity and/or object security level. The TCB shall be able to audit the identified
events that may be used in the exploitation of covert storage channels. The TCB
shall contain a mechanism that is able to monitor the occurrence or accumulation of
security auditable events that may indicate an imminent violation of security policy.
This mechanism shall be able to immediately notify the security administrator when
thresholds are exceeded, and if the occurrence or accumulation of these security
relevant events continues, the system shall take the least disruptive action to
terminate the event.
System Architecture (B3): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution
that protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its
code or data structures). The TCB shall maintain process isolation through the
provision of distinct address spaces under its control. The TCB shall be internally
structured into well-defined largely independent modules. It shall make effective
use of available hardware to separate those elements that are protection-critical
from those that are not. The TCB modules shall be designed such that the principle
of least privilege is enforced. Features in hardware, such as segmentation, shall be
used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (namely:
readable, writeable). The user interface to the TCB shall be completely defined and
all elements of the TCB identified. The TCB shall be designed and structured to use
a complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism with precisely defined
semantics. This mechanism shall play a central role in enforcing the internal
structuring of the TCB and the system. The TCB shall incorporate significant use of
layering, abstraction and data hiding. Significant system engineering shall be
directed toward minimizing the complexity of the TCB and excluding from the TCB
modules that are not protection-critical.
System Integrity (B3): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and
firmware elements of the TCB.
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Covert Channel Analysis (B3): The system developer shall conduct a thorough
search for covert channels and make a determination (either by actual
measurement or by engineering estimation) of the maximum bandwidth of each
identified channel. (See the Covert Channels Guideline section.)

Trusted Facility Management (B3): The TCB shall support separate operator and
administrator functions. The functions performed in the role of a security
administrator shall be identified. The ADP system administrative personnel shall
only be able to perform security administrator functions after taking a distinct
auditable action to assume the security administrator role on the ADP system. Nonsecurity functions that can be performed in the security administration role shall be
limited strictly to those essential to performing the security role effectively.

Trusted Recovery (B3): Procedures and/or mechanisms shall be provided to assure
that, after an ADP system failure or other discontinuity, recovery without a protection
compromise is obtained.
Security Testing (B3): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. A team of individuals
who thoroughly understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its
design documentation, source code, and object code to thorough analysis and
testing. Their objectives shall be: to uncover all design and implementation flaws
would permit a subject external to the TCB to read, change, or delete data normally
denied under the mandatory or discretionary security policy enforced by the TCB;
as well as to assure that no subject (without authorization to do so) is able to cause
the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to respond to communications
initiated by other users. The TCB shall be found resistant to penetration. All
discovered flaws shall be corrected and the TCB retested to demonstrate that they
have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been introduced. Testing shall
demonstrate that the TCB implementation is consistent with the descriptive top-level
specification. (See the Security Testing Guidelines.) No design flaws and no more
than a few correctable implementation flaws may be found during testing and there
shall be reasonable confidence that few remain.
Design Specification and Verification (B3): A formal model of the security policy
supported by the TCB shall be maintained over the life cycle of the ADP system that
is proven consistent with its axioms. A descriptive top-level specification (DTLS) of
the TCB shall be maintained that completely and accurately describes the TCB in
terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects. It shall be shown to be an
accurate description of the TCB interface. A convincing argument shall be given that
the DTLS is consistent with the model.
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Configuration Management (B3): During development and maintenance of the TCB,
a configuration management system shall be in place that maintains control of
changes to the descriptive top-level specification, other design data, implementation
documentation, source code, the running version of the object code, and test fixtures
and documentation. The configuration management system shall assure a
consistent mapping among all documentation and code associated with the
current version of the TCB. Tools shall be provided for generation of a new version
of the TCB from source code. Also available shall be tools for comparing a newly
generated version with the previous TCB version in
order to ascertain that only
the intended changes have been made in the code that will actually be used as the
new version of the TCB.

Security Features User's Guide (B3): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
Trusted Facility Manual (B3): A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when
running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall
be given. The manual shall describe the operator and
administrator functions
related to security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user. It
shall provide guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection
features of the system, how they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB,
and facility procedures, warnings, and privileges that need to be controlled in order
to operate the facility in a secure manner. The TCB modules that contain the
reference validation mechanism shall be identified. The procedures for secure
generation of a new TCB from source after modification of any modules in the TCB
shall be described. It shall include the procedures to ensure that the system is
initially started in a secure manner. Procedures shall also be included to resume
secure system operation after any lapse in system operation.

Test Documentation (B3): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms' functional testing.
It shall include results of testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce
covert channel bandwidths.
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Design Documentation (B3): Documentation shall be available that provides a
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how
this philosophy is translated into the TCB. The interfaces between the TCB
modules shall be described. A formal description of the security policy model
enforced by the TCB shall be available and proven that it is sufficient to enforce the
security policy. The specific TCB protection mechanisms shall be identified and an
explanation given to show that they satisfy the model. The descriptive top-level
specification (DTLS) shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB
interface. Documentation shall describe how the TCB implements the reference
monitor concept and give an explanation why it is tamper resistant, cannot be
bypassed, and is correctly implemented. The TCB implementation (i.e., in
hardware, firmware, and software) shall be informally shown to be consistent with
the DTLS. The elements of the DTLS shall be shown, using informal techniques, to
correspond to the elements of the TCB. Documentation shall describe how the TCB
is structured to facilitate testing and to enforce least privilege. This documentation
shall also present the results of the covert channel analysis and the tradeoffs
involved in restricting the channels. All auditable events that may be used in the
exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be identified. The bandwidths of
known covert storage channels, the use of which is not detectable by the auditing
mechanisms, shall be provided. (See the Covert Channel Guideline section.
(A1): A formal model of the security policy must be clearly identified and
documented, including a mathematical proof that the model is consistent with its
axioms and is sufficient to support the security policy.
(A1): An (Formal Top Level Specification) FTLS must be produced that includes
abstract definitions of the functions the TCB performs and of the hardware and/or
firmware mechanisms that are used to support separate execution domains.

(A1): The FTLS of the TCB must be shown to be consistent with the model by
formal techniques where possible (i.e., where verification tools exist) and informal
ones otherwise.
(A1): The TCB implementation (i.e., in hardware, firmware, and software) must be
informally shown to be consistent with the FTLS. The elements of the FTLS must be
shown, using informal techniques, to correspond to the elements of the TCB. The
FTLS must express the unified protection mechanism required to satisfy the
security policy, and it is the elements of this protection mechanism that are mapped
to the elements of the TCB.

(A1): Formal analysis techniques must be used to identify and analyze covert
channels. Informal techniques may be used to identify covert timing channels. The
continued existence of identified covert channels in the system must be justified.
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Discretionary Access Control (A1): The TCB shall define and control access between
named users and named objects (e.g., files and programs) in the ADP system. The
enforcement mechanism (e.g., access control lists) shall allow users to specify and
control sharing of those objects, and shall provide controls to limit propagation of
access rights. The discretionary access control mechanism shall, either by explicit
user action or by default, provide that objects are protected from unauthorized
access. These access controls shall be capable of specifying, for each named
object, a list of named individuals and a list of groups of named individuals with
their respective modes of access to that object. Furthermore, for each such named
object, it shall be possible to specify a list of named individuals and a list of groups
of named individuals for which no access to the object is to be given. Access
permission to an object by users not already possessing access permission shall
only be assigned by authorized users.

Object Reuse (A1): All authorizations to the information contained within a storage
object shall be revoked prior to initial assignment, allocation or reallocation to a
subject from the TCB's pool of unused storage objects. No information, including
encrypted representations of information, produced by a prior subject's actions is to
be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been released
back to the system.
Labels (A1): Sensitivity labels associated with each ADP system resource (e.g.,
subject, storage object, ROM) that is directly or indirectly accessible by subjects
external to the TCB shall be maintained by the TCB. These labels shall be used as
the basis for mandatory access control decisions. In order to import non-labeled
data, the TCB shall request and receive from an authorized user the security level
of the data, and all such actions shall be auditable by the TCB.

Label Integrity (A1): Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security levels of
the specific subjects or objects with which they are associated. When exported by
the TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and unambiguously represent the internal
labels and shall be associated with the information being exported.

Exportation of Labeled Information (A1): The TCB shall designate each
communication channel and I/O device as either single-level or multilevel. Any
change in this designation shall be done manually and shall be auditable by the
TCB. The TCB shall maintain and be able to audit any change in the security level
or levels associated with a communication channel or I/O device.
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Exportation to Multilevel Devices (A1): When the TCB exports an object to a
multilevel I/O device, the sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be
exported and shall reside on the same physical medium as the exported
information and shall be in the same form (i.e., machine-readable or humanreadable form). When the TCB exports or imports an object over a multilevel
communication channel, the protocol used on that channel shall provide for the
unambiguous pairing between the sensitivity labels and the associated information
that is sent or received.

Exportation to Single Level Devices (A1): Single-level I/O devices and single-level
communication channels are not required to maintain the sensitivity labels of the
information they process. However, the TCB shall include a mechanism by which
the TCB and an authorized user reliably communicate to designate the single
security level of information imported or exported via single-level communication
channels or I/O devices.

Subject Sensitivity Labels (A1): The TCB shall immediately notify a terminal user of
each change in the security level associated with that user during an interactive
session. A terminal user shall be able to query the TCB as desired for a display of
the subject's complete sensitivity label.

Device Labels (A1): The TCB shall support the assignment of minimum and
maximum security levels to all attached physical devices. These security levels
shall be used by the TCB to enforce constraints imposed by the physical
environments in which the devices are located.
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Mandatory Access Control (A1): The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control
policy over all resources (i.e., subjects, storage objects, and I/O devices) that are
directly or indirectly accessible by subjects external to the TCB. These subjects and
objects shall be assigned sensitivity labels that are a combination of hierarchical
classification levels and non-hierarchical categories, and the labels shall be used as
the basis for mandatory access control decisions. The TCB shall be able to support
two or more such security levels. (See the Mandatory Access Control guidelines.)
The following requirements shall hold for all accesses between all subjects external
to the TCB and all objects directly or indirectly accessible by these subjects: A
subject can read an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's
security level is greater than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's
security level and the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level
include all the non-hierarchical categories in the object's security level. A subject
can write an object only if the hierarchical classification in the subject's security
level is less than or equal to the hierarchical classification in the object's security
level and all the non-hierarchical categories in the subject's security level are
included in the non- hierarchical categories in the object's security level.
Identification and authentication data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the
user's identity and to ensure that the security level and authorization of subjects
external to the TCB that may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are
dominated by the clearance and authorization of that user.

Identification and Authentication (A1): The TCB shall require users to identify
themselves to it before beginning to perform any other actions that the TCB is
expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB shall maintain authentication data that
includes information for verifying the identity of individual users (e.g., passwords) as
well as information for determining the clearance and authorizations of individual
users. This data shall be used by the TCB to authenticate the user's identity and to
ensure that the security level and authorizations of subjects external to the TCB
that may be created to act on behalf of the individual user are dominated by the
clearance and authorization of that user. The TCB shall protect authentication data
so that it cannot be accessed by any unauthorized user. The TCB shall be able to
enforce individual accountability by providing the capability to uniquely identify each
individual ADP system user. The TCB shall also provide the capability of
associating this identity with all auditable actions taken by that individual.
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Trusted Path (A1): The TCB shall support a trusted communication path between
itself and users for use when a positive TCB-to- user connection is required (e.g.,
login, change subject security level). Communications via this trusted path shall be
activated exclusively by a user or the TCB and shall be logically isolated and
unmistakably distinguishable from other paths.

Audit (A1): The TCB shall be able to create, maintain, and protect from modification
or unauthorized access or destruction an audit trail of accesses to the objects it
protects. The audit data shall be protected by the TCB so that read access to it is
limited to those who are authorized for audit data. The TCB shall be able to record
the following types of events: use of identification and authentication mechanisms,
introduction of objects into a user's address space (e.g., file open, program
initiation), deletion of objects, and actions taken by computer operators and system
administrators and/or system security officers, and other security relevant events.
The TCB shall also be able to audit any override of human-readable output
markings. For each recorded event, the audit record shall identify: date and time of
the event, user, type of event, and success or failure of the event. For identification/
authentication events the origin of request (e.g., terminal ID) shall be included in the
audit record. For events that introduce an object into a user's address space and for
object deletion events the audit record shall include the name of the object and the
object's security level. The ADP system administrator shall be able to selectively
audit the actions of any one or more users based on individual identity and/or object
security level. The TCB shall be able to audit the identified events that may be used
in the exploitation of covert storage channels. The TCB shall contain a mechanism
that is able to monitor the occurrence or accumulation of security auditable events
that may indicate an imminent violation of security policy. This mechanism shall be
able to immediately notify the security administrator when thresholds are exceeded,
and, if the occurrence or accumulation of these security relevant events continues,
the system shall take the least disruptive action to terminate the event.
System Architecture (A1): The TCB shall maintain a domain for its own execution
that protects it from external interference or tampering (e.g., by modification of its
code or data structures). The TCB shall maintain process isolation through the
provision of distinct address spaces under its control. The TCB shall be internally
structured into well-defined largely independent modules. It shall make effective use
of available hardware to separate those elements that are protection-critical from
those that are not. The TCB modules shall be designed such that the principle of
least privilege is enforced. Features in hardware, such as segmentation, shall be
used to support logically distinct storage objects with separate attributes (namely:
readable, writeable). The user interface to the TCB shall be completely defined and
all elements of the TCB identified. The TCB shall be designed and structured to use
a complete, conceptually simple protection mechanism with precisely defined
semantics. This mechanism shall play a central role in enforcing the internal
structuring of the TCB and the system. The TCB shall incorporate significant use of
layering, abstraction and data hiding. Significant system engineering shall be
directed toward minimizing the complexity of the TCB and excluding from the TCB
modules that are not protection-critical.
System Integrity (A1): Hardware and/or software features shall be provided that can
be used to periodically validate the correct operation of the on-site hardware and
firmware elements of the TCB.
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Covert Channel Analysis (A1): The system developer shall conduct a thorough
search for covert channels and make a determination (either by actual
measurement or by engineering estimation) of the maximum bandwidth of each
identified channel. (See the Covert Channels Guideline section.) Formal methods
shall be used in the analysis.

Trusted Facility Management (A1): The TCB shall support separate operator and
administrator functions. The functions performed in the role of a security
administrator shall be identified. The ADP system administrative personnel shall
only be able to perform security administrator functions after taking a distinct
auditable action to assume the security administrator role on the ADP system. Nonsecurity functions that can be performed in the security administration role shall be
limited strictly to those essential to performing the security role effectively.

Trusted Recovery (A1): Procedures and/or mechanisms shall be provided to assure
that, after an ADP system failure or other discontinuity, recovery without a protection
compromise is obtained.
Security Testing (A1): The security mechanisms of the ADP system shall be tested
and found to work as claimed in the system documentation. A team of individuals
who thoroughly understand the specific implementation of the TCB shall subject its
design documentation, source code, and object code to thorough analysis and
testing. Their objectives shall be: to uncover all design and implementation flaws
that would permit a subject external to the TCB to read, change, or delete data
normally denied under the mandatory or discretionary security policy enforced by
the TCB; as well as to assure that no subject (without authorization to do so) is able
to cause the TCB to enter a state such that it is unable to respond to
communications initiated by other users. The TCB shall be found resistant to
penetration. All discovered flaws shall be corrected and the TCB retested to
demonstrate that they have been eliminated and that new flaws have not been
introduced. Testing shall demonstrate that theTCB implementation is consistent with
the formal top- level specification. (See the Security Testing Guidelines.) No
design flaws and no more than a few correctable implementation flaws may be found
during testing and there shall be reasonable confidence that few remain. Manual or
other mapping of the FTLS to the source code may form a basis for penetration
testing.
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Design Specification and Verification (A1): A formal model of the security policy
supported by the TCB shall be maintained over the life-cycle of the ADP system
that is proven consistent with its axioms. A descriptive top-level specification
(DTLS) of the TCB shall be maintained that completely and accurately describes
the TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects. A formal top-level
specification (FTLS) of the TCB shall be maintained that accurately describes the
TCB in terms of exceptions, error messages, and effects. The DTLS and FTLS shall
include those components of the TCB that are implemented as hardware and/or
firmware if their properties are visible at the TCB interface. The FTLS shall be
shown to be an accurate description of the TCB interface. A convincing argument
shall be given that the DTLS is consistent with the model and a combination of
formal and informal techniques shall be used to show that the FTLS is consistent
with the model. This verification evidence shall be consistent with that provided
within the state-of-the-art of the particular computer security center-endorsed formal
specification and verification system used. Manual or other mapping of the FTLS to
the TCB source code shall be performed to provide evidence of correct
implementation.
Configuration Management (A1): During the entire life-cycle, i.e., during the design,
development, and maintenance of the TCB, a configuration management system
shall be in place for all security- relevant hardware, firmware, and software that
maintains control of changes to the formal model, the descriptive and formal toplevel specifications, other design data, implementation documentation, source
code, the running version of the object code, and test fixtures and documentation.
The configuration management system shall assure a consistent mapping among all
documentation and code associated with the current version of the TCB. Tools shall
be provided for generation of a new version of the TCB from source code. Also
available shall be tools, maintained under strict configuration control, for
comparing a newly generated version with the previous TCB version in order to
ascertain that only the intended changes have been made in the code that will
actually be used as the new version of the TCB. A combination of technical,
physical, and procedural safeguards shall be used to protect from unauthorized
modification or destruction the master copy or copies of all material used to
generate the TCB.
Trusted Distribution (A1): A trusted ADP system control and distribution facility shall
be provided for maintaining the integrity of the mapping between the master data
describing the current version of the TCB and the on-site master copy of thecode for
the current version. Procedures (e.g., site security acceptance testing) shall exist
for assuring that the TCb software, firmware, and hardware updates distributed to
a customer are exactly as specified by the master copies.

Security Features User's Guide (A1): A single summary, chapter, or manual in user
documentation shall describe the protection mechanisms provided by the TCB,
guidelines on their use, and how they interact with one another.
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Trusted Facility Manual (A1): A manual addressed to the ADP system administrator
shall present cautions about functions and privileges that should be controlled when
running a secure facility. The procedures for examining and maintaining the audit
files as well as the detailed audit record structure for each type of audit event shall
be given. The manual shall describe the operator and administrator functions
related to security, to include changing the security characteristics of a user. It
shallprovide guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the protection features
of the system, how they interact, how to securely generate a new TCB, and facility
procedures, warnings, and privileges that need to be controlled in order to operate
the facility in a secure manner. The TCB modules that contain the reference
validation mechanism shall be identified. The procedures for secure generation of
a new TCB from source after modification of any modules in the TCB shall be
described. It shall include the procedures to ensure that the system is initially
started in a secure manner. Procedures shall also be included to resume secure
system operation after any lapse in system operation.
Test Documentation (A1): The system developer shall provide to the evaluators a
document that describes the test plan, test procedures that show how the security
mechanisms were tested, and results of the security mechanisms' functional testing.
It shall include results of testing the effectiveness of the methods used to reduce
covertchannel bandwidths. The results of the mapping between the formal top-level
specification and the TCB source code shall be given.

Design Documentation (A1): Documentation shall be available that provides a
description of the manufacturer's philosophy of protection and an explanation of how
this philosophy is translated into the TCB. The interfaces between the TCB
modules shall be described. A formal description of the security policy model
enforced by the TCB shall be available and proven that it is sufficient to enforce the
security policy. The specific TCB protection mechanisms shall be identified and an
explanation given to show that they satisfy the model. The descriptive top-level
speci- fication (DTLS) shall be shown to be an accurate description of the TCB
interface. Documentation shall describe how the TCB implements the reference
monitor concept and give an explana- tion why it is tamper resistant, cannot be
bypassed, and is correctly implemented. The TCB implementation (i.e., in
hardware, firmware, and software) shall be informally shown to be consistent with
the formal top-level specification (FTLS). The elements of the FTLS shall be shown,
using informal techniques, to correspond to the elements of the TCB.
Documentation shall describe how the TCB is structured tofacilitate testing and to
enforce least privilege. This
documentation shall also present the results of the covert
channel analysis and the tradeoffs involved in restricting the
channels. All auditable events that may be used in the
exploitation of known covert storage channels shall be
identified. The bandwidths of known covert storage channels,
the use of which is not detectable by the auditing mechanisms,
shall be provided. (See the Covert Channel Guideline section.)
Hardware, firmware, and software mechanisms not dealt with in
the FTLS but strictly internal to the TCB (e.g., mapping
registers, direct memory access I/O) shall be clearly described.

103

104

Bibliography
1. Trappe, Wade and Washington, Lawrence, Introduction to Cryptography with Coding
Theory Second Edition, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006.
2. European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD); Use Cases. ETSI GS QKD 008 v1.1.1, Sophia Antipolis Cedex – FRANCE,
2010
3. European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD); QKD Module Security Specification. ETSI GS QKD 008 v1.1.1, Sophia
Antipolis Cedex – FRANCE, 2010
4. European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD); Security Proofs. ETSI GS QKD 008 v1.1.1, Sophia Antipolis Cedex –
FRANCE, 2010
5. European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD); Components and Internal Interfaces. ETSI GS QKD 008 v1.1.1, Sophia
Antipolis Cedex – FRANCE, 2010
6. European Telecommunications Standards Institute. Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD); Application Interface. ETSI GS QKD 008 v1.1.1, Sophia Antipolis Cedex –
FRANCE, 2010
7. Bennet, Charles H., and Gilles Brassard. “Quantum Cryptography: Public Key
Distribution and Coin Tossing,” Proceeding of the International Conference on
Computers, Systems & Signal Processing. 1984.
8. Bennet, Charles, Francois Bessette, Filles Brassard, Louis Salvail, and John Smolin,
“Experimental Quantum Cryptography,” Journal of Cryptology. (1992).
9. Gobby, C. Z.L. Yuan, and A. J. Shields. “Quantum Key Distribution Over 122 km of
Standard Telecom Fiber,” Applied Physics Letters, 84: 3762-3764 (2009).
10. Meyer-Scott, Evan, Zhizhong Yan, Allison MacDonald, Jean-Philippe Bourgoin,
Hannes Hubel, and Thomas Jennwein. “How to Implement Decoy-state Quantum
Key Distribution for a Satellite Uplink with 50-dB Channel Loss,” A Physical
Review, (2011).
11. Chapuran, T E, P Toliver, N A Peters, J Jackel, M S Goodman, R J Runser, S R
McNown, N Dallmann, R J Hughes, K P McCabe, J E Nordholt, C G Peterson, K T
Tyagi, L. Mercer, and H. Dardy. “Optical Networking for Quantum Key Distribution
and Quantum Communications,” New Journal of Physics, 11 (2009).

105

12. Nakassis, Tassos, J.C. Bienfang, P. Johnson, A. Mink, D. Rogers, X. Tang, and C.J.
Williams. “Has Quantum Cryptography Been Proven Secure?” Quantum Information
and Computation, 6244 (2006).
13. Wiechers, C, L Lydersen, C Wittmann, D Elser, K Skaar, Ch Marquardt, V, Makarov,
and G Leuchs. “After-gate Attack on a Quantum Cryptosystem,” New Journal of
Physics, 13 (January 2011).
14. Nauerth, Sebastian, Martin Furst, Tobias Schmitt-Manderbach, Henning Weier, and
Harold Weinfurter. “Information Leakage via Side Channels in Freespace BB84
Quantum Cryptography,” New Journal of Physics, 11 (3 June 2009).
15. Bing, Qi, Chi-Hang Fred Fung, Hoi-Kwong Lo, and Xiongfeng Ma. “Time-shift
Attack in Practical Quantum Cryptosystems,” Quantum Information & Computation,
7: 73-82 (2007).
16. Makarov, Vadim, Andrey Anisimov, and Johannes Skaar. “Effects of Detector
Efficiency Mismatch on Security of Quantum Cryptosystems,” A Physical Review, 78
(31 June 2008).
17. Department of Defense. Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation
Criteria. DoD 5200.28-STD. Washington, 15 August 1983.
18. The Defence Signals Directorate and others, Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation. CCMB-2009-07-001, July 2009
19. Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. FIPS PUB 140-2, Gaithersburg,
MD, 11 January 1994.
20. Architecture and Principles of Systems Engineering, C.E. Dickerson, D.N. Mavris,
2010 Taylor and Francis Group, LLC.
21. Department of Defense. DoD Architecture Framework Version 2.0. Washington:
GPO, 28 May 2009.
22. United States Congress. Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. Public Law No. 104-106, 104th
Congress, 2nd Session. Washington: GPO, 1996.
23. United States Congress. E-Government Act of 2002. Title 44, Ch 36, 107th Congress,
2nd Session. Washington: GPO, 2002.
24. Office of Management and Budget. “Management of Federal Information
Resources,” Office of Management and Budget Circular, A-130, (February 1996).

106

25. Federal Enterprise Architecture Program Management Office. FEA Consolidated
Reference Model Document Version 2.3. Washington: Office of Management and
Budget, October 2007.
26. Office of Management and Budget. Improving Agency Performance and Using
Information and Information Technology (Enterprise Architecture Assessment
Framework v3.1). Washington: Office of Management and Budget, June 2009.
27. United States General Accounting Office. Information Technology A Framework for
Assessing and Improving Enterprise Architecture Management (Version 1.1). GAO03-584, April 2003.
28. International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE). Systems Engineering
Handbook A Guide For System Life Cycle Processes and Activities. INCOSE-TP2003-002-03.2. San Diego, CA, January 2011.
29. Ghernaouti-Helie, Tashi, Langer, Monyk, “Quantum Cryptography: An Innovation in
the Domain of Secure Information Transmission,” (Sep 2008).
30. M. Wegman and L. Carter, “New Hash Functions and Their Use in Authentication
and Set Equality,” J. Comp.Sys.Sci, 22, 265-279, (1981).
31. Metrology for Industrial Quantum Communications.
http://projects.npl.co.uk/MIQC/index.html. 15 February 2012.
33. Wiesner, S., “Conjugate Coding,” Sigact News, Vol 15, no.1, 78-88, (1983).
34. Bennet, C. H., G. Brassard, S. Breidbart and S. Wiesner, “Quantum Cryptography or
Unforgeable Subway Tokens,” in Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto ’82,
Plenum Press, 1982.
35. National Institute of Standards and Technology. “Rainbow Series.” Security
Publications. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/secpubs/rainbow/. Retrieved October 2011
36. Busch, Carol, Paul S. De Maret, Teresa Flynn, Rachel Kellum, Sheri Le, Brad
Meyers, Matt Saunders, Robert White, and Mike Palmquist. (2005). Content
Analysis. Writing@CSU. Colorado State University Department of English. from
http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/content/. Retrieved Mar 2012

107

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources,
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of
information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188),
1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any
penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
2. REPORT TYPE

3. DATES COVERED (From – To)

22 Mar 2012

20 Aug 2010 - 22 Mar 2012

Master’s Thesis

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

Security Standards and Best Practice Considerations for Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD)

5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

Harper, Carole, A., Captain, USAF

5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)

Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Way, Building 640
WPAFB OH 45433-8865
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER

AFIT/GSE/ENV/12-M05
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

Dr. Gerry Baumgartner
Laboratory for Telecommunications Sciences
8080 Greenmead Drive
College Park MD 20740
(240) 373-2743

LTS
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A. APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

This material is declared work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
14. ABSTRACT

QKD systems combine cryptographic primitives with quantum information theory to produce a theoretic unconditionally
secure cryptographic key. However, real-world implementations of QKD systems are far from ideal and significantly differ
from the theoretic model. Because of this, real-world QKD systems require additional practical considerations when
implemented to achieve secure operations. In this thesis, a content analysis of the published literature is conducted to
determine if established security and cryptographic standards and best practices are addressed in real world, practical QKD
implementations. The research reveals that most published, real world QKD implementations do not take advantage of
established security and cryptographic standards and best practices. Based upon an analysis of existing security and
cryptographic standards and best practices, systems architecture methodology is used to make recommendations for how these
standards can and should be applied to establish a practical, secure, QKD system framework.
15. SUBJECT TERMS

Quantum Key Distribution, Systems Engineering, Systems Architecture, Cryptography, Industry Technical Standards
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT

17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER
ABSTRACT
OF PAGES

b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE

U

U

U

19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON

Dr. Michael Grimaila
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)

UU

119

(937) 255-3636, x 4800
(Michael.Grimaila@afit.edu)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

